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INTRODUCTION
The transformation of the People’s Republic of China (China) into a market
economy and its ascendancy into a global economic power increases the
importance of studying its private laws (contract, torts, property, and unjust
enrichment). The twin pillars of a market economy are private property and
contract law. This Article will focus on the latter of the two pillars. The
evolution of Chinese contract law provides an opportunity to study the
influences of foreign laws and the formal transplantation of foreign and
international law into a different cultural and legal tradition. China’s formation
of private contract law, beginning in the mid-1980s, is particularly interesting
because of the breadth of foreign law influences involved in its development.
However, the use and partial transplantation of a variety of sources can have
unintended consequences. In the case of the Chinese Contract Law (CCL), it has
led to a number of gaps and inconsistencies.
Part II of this Article provides the context for the more in-depth analysis of
Part III. First, it provides a brief history of the evolution of modern Chinese
contract law, including the variety of foreign laws used in its development.
Second, it reviews the notion of “double transplantation,” which in China’s case
involved the adoption of the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the
International Sale of Goods (CISG) and the reuse of the CISG in drafting the
CCL. Third, it briefly illustrates the benefits of comparative law methodology as
a tool for understanding and reforming the CCL.
Part III provides case studies focusing on three inconsistent and gap-ridden
areas in the CCL: late acceptance rules, anticipatory breach, and the right to
cure. These case studies analyze the CCL and the multiple interpretations
applied to these three areas. Part III then uses comparative law sources to
recommend how the CCL can be reformed to become a more consistent,
rational, and comprehensive contract law.
Finally, Part IV provides some concluding remarks.
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I.
BORROWING: RECEPTION AND TRANSPLANTATION IN CHINA
The People’s Republic of China has gone through a series of receptions and
legal transplantations1 from foreign and international private laws since it began
in earnest to transition from a planned economy to a market economy during the
1980s.2 In order to facilitate trade, it adopted the Foreign Economic Contract
Law of 1985 (FECL) to assure foreign parties a more modern Chinese contract
law would apply to their transactions. The FECL was a comprehensible contract
law stylized after modern Western civil codes. In 1988, China also became an
original signatory to the CISG. This demonstrated again China’s willingness to
follow Western-style contract law, as well as its foresight in seeing the benefits
of a uniform international sales law to the emerging economic power that it was
fast becoming. The westernization of Chinese contract law was also found in the
Economic Contract Law (1981), General Principles of Civil Law (1986), and the
Technology Contract Law (1987). In 1999, China elected to harmonize its
domestic and foreign contract laws. The FECL was repealed and a uniform
national contract law was enacted—the CCL.3

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.15779/Z38756T
*Associate Professor, Quanzhou Normal University, China. This research was supported by Fujian
Social Sciences Funding Program (No. FJ2015C036).
**Huber Hurst Professor of Contract Law, University of Florida, Warrington College of Business.
1. The term “legal transplants” was coined in Alan Watson’s seminal work Legal
Transplants. He defined legal transplants as “the moving of a rule or system of law from one country
to another.” ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS: AN APPROACH TO COMPARATIVE LAW 22
(1974). Another term used for the transference of entire legal systems is “reception.” For example,
scholars speak of the reception of Roman law by the emerging countries of Europe, as well as the
reception of French (or German) Civil Law by other countries, including certain countries in Latin
and South America. See K. ZWEIGERT & H. KÖTZ, AN INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW 98119 (Tony Weir trans., 3d ed. 1998). The words “transplant” and “reception” can be used
interchangeably. This Article uses “transplant” to refer specifically to the transfer or expression of
rules and “reception” as transfer in the broader sense of the adoption of foreign law for an entire area
of law (contract, criminal, civil procedure, and so forth). “Reception” can describe foreign
“influences” on the entire legal system of the receiving country. For example, German law is highly
respected in China and has had a strong influence on the development of Chinese private law. Even
though this Article will primarily use the narrower Watsonian term “transplant,” it is also referring to
China’s broader reception of Western legal concepts and forms of legal reasoning. This Article’s
focus on the transfer of written rules does not mean to discount the significance of studying the
broader reception of legal ideas, which, although more abstract, can be an even more powerful force
in changing a legal culture or tradition. See Jörg Fedtke, Legal Transplants, in ELGAR
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW 434 (Jan M. Smits ed., 2006). Jörg Fedtke notes that the two
concepts are in fact closely related: “In many cases, borrowing will not result in the copying of a
specific text but rather in the transplantation of an idea.” Id. at 436 (emphasis added). The word
borrowing is a better, more encompassing term that is broad enough to capture both formal
transplantation and various other forms of influence. This terminology is especially useful in China’s
case, given it is a civil law country by nature that has also been influenced by common law and
international private law instruments.
2. See, e.g., CHINA’S GREAT ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION (Loren Brandt & Thomas G.
Rawski eds., 2008) (documenting rise as a globally influential market economy).
3. The analysis in this Article is restricted to the contract law of mainland China as
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Thus, in a short period of time China received or enacted a series of
Western-style contract laws—the FECL, CISG, and CCL. This Article will look
at a few of the inevitable complications of such a transformation of national law.
Inevitable problems in adopting foreign law may arise from: (1) translating
foreign legal concepts, principles, and rules from one language to another; (2)
introducing a new foreign legal regime into existing domestic legal and cultural
traditions; (3) interpreting the words of a new law, which may already have
particular meaning in the foreign traditions from which they came; and (4)
introducing a foreign text into a country without an existing body of
jurisprudence or expertise to properly and consistently apply the new law.
China’s adoption of the CISG was one of the more successful receptions.
One reason for this success is the wealth of international case law and
commentaries Chinese legal bodies have been able to rely on in applying
CISG’s provisions. Currently, there is no hard evidence whether or not the
Chinese courts have been adept at applying the CISG in a consistent way,
rendering well-reasoned and autonomous interpretations in accordance with
CISG’s mandate.4 However, there is strong evidence that Chinese arbitral bodies
have successfully done so. There are currently 432 published decisions, in
English, of Chinese courts and arbitral bodies applying the CISG, including 336
from China’s premier arbitral body, the China International Economic and Trade
Arbitration Commission (CIETAC).5 The CIETAC awards have generally been
well-reasoned and of high quality, showing the Commission’s ability to
understand and properly apply the CISG in an unbiased manner.6
The larger issue and focus of this Article is whether Chinese courts have
successfully interpreted and applied the CCL. There is no simple answer to this
question. There are a myriad of reasons why it is difficult to assess Chinese
courts’ ability to consistently apply the CCL. First, China is generically
classified as a civil law country.7 As such, case law is not as important as it

represented by the CCL. It will not discuss the law of the semi-autonomous regions of Hong Kong
(English common law), Macau (Macau Civil Code), or Taiwan (Civil Code of Republic of China
and Portuguese civil law).
4. See United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, Apr. 11,
1980, 1489 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter CISG], art. 7.
5. See CHINA INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC AND TRADE ARBITRATION COMMISSION,
www.cietac.org.
6. The CIETAC Awards that currently appear on the Pace CISG Database run only to April
of
2008.
See
CISG
Database,
PACE
L.
SCH.
INST.
INT’L
COM.
L.,
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/text/casecit.html#china (last visited on Apr. 22, 2015).
7. The civil law nature of Chinese law may be traced back to the Qin criminal laws (221-206
BC) and the subsequent laws of the Song, Yuan, Ming, and Qing dynasties. “Compiled in 1740, the
436 statutes and 1900 sub-statutes of the Great Qing Code was (“was” is grammatically incorrect
here, maybe check source) the last dynastic legal code of Imperial China and, like its predecessors,
was chiefly a criminal code.” DANIEL C. K. CHOW, THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC
OF CHINA 41-42 (2d ed. 2009). The civil law nature of Chinese law has been recently reaffirmed by
its decision to continue the process of enacting a Chinese Civil Code (Draft CCC). See Wang
Liming, Historic Characteristics of Modern Civil Code and its Codification Process, 8 TSINGHUA L.
REV. 6-16 (2014).

http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/bjil/vol34/iss1/5
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.15779/Z38756T

48

BERKELEY JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 34:1

would be in a common law country. Second, the depth of the jurisprudence
surrounding the CCL is relatively limited given that the law has been on the
books for a short period of time. Third, the text of the CCL has a number of gaps
and inconsistencies that have made it difficult for the courts to understand and
uniformly apply its rules. This Article will highlight some of these gaps and
inconsistences and suggest a number of solutions that would make the CCL a
more holistic and rational law.
The transplantation of law has been a common occurrence in world history.
Alan Watson in his seminal book Legal Transplants states “legal transplants—
the moving of a rule or a system of law from one country to another—have been
common since the earliest recorded history.”8 Roscoe Pound noted: “History of
a system of law is largely a history of borrowings of legal materials from other
legal systems and of assimilation of materials from outside of the law.”9 Modern
Western legal systems, and many non-Western ones, have evolved through the
transplantation and assimilation of either Roman civil law or English common
law.10
The theory of transference or transplantation of law is not without its
critics. Pierre Legrand regarded transplantation of laws as an illusion, arguing
the “impossibility of legal transplant . . . what can be displaced from one
jurisdiction to another is, literally, a meaningless form of words.”11 Despite the
debate over the normative power or degree of success that legal transplants may
have, a historical accounting, as noted by Alan Watson, shows that receptions of
transplants and foreign law influences have been common in the evolution of
legal systems.12 Successful transplantations should be measured by a relative
standard, whether transplantation leads to improvements in the law of the
transplanting country, and not by an absolute standard, such as whether
meanings attached to the words and concepts of the transplanted law have
acquired the same meaning in the country of transplantation as in the country of
origin. The likelihood of relative success is largely dependent on the
transplanted law, those who apply it, and the level of sensitivity afforded to the
legal and cultural context of the transplanting country.13 In the end, that
8. WATSON, supra note 1, at 21.
9. Id. at 22.
10. Id.
11. Pierre Legrand, The Impossibility of Legal Transplant, 4 MAASTRICHT J. EUR. & COMP.
L. 111, 120 (1997).
12. For an earlier accounting of a massive legal transplantation, see Hitoshi Aoki, Nobushige
Hozumi: A Skillful Transplanter of Western Legal Thought into Japanese Soil, in RETHINKING THE
MASTERS OF COMPARATIVE LAW 129 (Annelise Riles ed., 2001) (German law influences in the
drafting of the Japanese Civil Code of 1898).
13. Professor Chen Lei states that in the case of legal transplantation in China and Hong
Kong:
[O]ne can conclude that as long as legal ideas are sensitive to the cultural and political
context, they can move freely across the continent and influence legislation and
developing legal reform—realizing that the concept of law we use as our perception of
law does not prevent us from establishing a universal legal theory.
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sensitivity will generate meanings and applications that vary from the law of the
country from which the law was transplanted. In this context, success should be
judged relative to the law prior to transplantation: is the transplanted law as
interpreted and applied more consistent, more rational, and more attuned to
modern commercial dealings than the prior law?
Law, whether found in a code or in case law, especially in the area of
commercial law, has always had a binary relationship with the context in which
it is interpreted and applied. This relationship, writ large, places the role of law
in society as both a receptive and a proactive element. Commercial law, for
example, generally reflects the usages, customs, and norms of commercial
practice. At the same time, the law can influence the development of good
practices and deter the development of exploitative behavior through what Karl
Llewellyn referred to as the role of “marking out the limits of the permissible.”14
In the case of China, this binary relationship heavily favors the importance of
historical but evolving customs over the strict application of formal law. In
contract law, the reception of foreign and international law influences can be
seen as the first step in the development of a new Chinese legal culture that
combines the uniqueness of Chinese customary practice with the new formalized
rules of the CCL. The transplanted law acts as a catalyst bringing about an
interpretive debate as to what the transplanted law should mean, and how the
legal culture should change to make it work.15
Current Chinese commercial laws reflect the influence of European civil
laws, especially German law,16 and common law to a certain extent. The
problem of legal transplants, as noted above, is that the text of law is easily
movable from one country to the next, but legal tradition, reasoning, and theory
are not so easily transplanted. Thus, legal text is taken out of the legal tradition
and culture that gives it meaning and placed within (in the case of China) the

Chen Lei, Contextualizing Legal Transplants: China and Hong Kong, in METHODS OF
COMPARATIVE LAW 192-93 (Pier G. Monateri ed., 2012) [hereinafter Lei, Contextualizing Legal
Transplants].
14. See K.N. Llewellyn, Book Review, 52 HARV. L. REV. 700, 704 (1939). For a discussion
of this normative concept, see Larry A. DiMatteo, A Theory of Interpretation in the Realm of
Idealism, 5 DEPAUL BUS. & COMM. L.J. 17, 26-27 (2006).
15. See Lei, Contextualizing Legal Transplant, supra note 13, at 194 (citing Gunther Teubner,
Legal Irritants: Good Faith in British Law or How Unifying Law Ends up in New Divergences,
MOD. L. REV. 11 (1998)).
16. Chen Lei notes, “Europe’s civil law tradition shares many similar values with China’s
legal tradition.” He explains the civil law and traditional Chinese law prefer the “generalization of
principles” and more of a communitarian perspective, as opposed to the more individualistic spirit of
the common law. Lei, Contextualizing Legal Transplant, supra note 13, at 197. See also Liang
Huixing, The Reception of Foreign Civil Law in China, 1 SHANDONG U. L. REV. 5 (2003)
[hereinafter Foreign Civil Law]; Percy R. Luney Jr., Traditional and Foreign Influences: Systems of
Law in China and Japan, 52 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 129 (1989); Xiangmin Xu et al., The
Similarities Between Civil Law Legal Family and Chinese Legal Family, 5 J. OCEAN U. OF CHINA
48 (2005). But see Mary Ip, The Revised Contract Law and Its Implications on Consumerism in
China, 9 INT’L J. BUS. 42, 45 (2004) (stating that the CCL “adopted and modified certain basic
elements from the common law system, such as offer and acceptance.”).
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context of a different legal tradition with its own distinct legal thought and view
of the role of law in society. However, through a gradual process, the original
legal culture, reasoning, and theory that first animated the transplanted law can
be used later to understand and nurture that law in the country of transplantation.
Professor Han Shiyuan has made such a case in the area of pre-contractual
liability.17 German law has had the greatest influence on modern Chinese law.
An example of this influence is China’s adoption of culpa in contrahendo or bad
faith negotiation, which is found in civil law but not in common law. Professor
Han notes the concept of pre-contractual liability (culpa in contrahendo) was
first introduced into Chinese law with the adoption of the FECL in 1985, and a
notion of bad faith negotiation that is similar to culpa in contrahendo was
subsequently incorporated into Articles 41 and 42 of the CCL.18 However, Han
argues the ability of the Chinese courts to understand and apply such a concept
depends on what he calls “theory reception.”19 A law of pre-contractual liability
is more than a set of fixed rules; it is based on a broad theory of good faith. He
notes CCL Articles 41 and 42 make numerous “references to foreign civil law
theories and provisions,”20 including Articles 2.1.15 and 2.1.16 of the
UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts (PICC),21 and
Articles 2:301 and 2:302 of the Principles of European Contract Law (PECL).22
However, simply referencing other legal instruments on the principle of good
faith is unlikely to effectuate a transplant of legal theory or lead to a more
complete understanding of the legal concept; only education in the civil law can
achieve such a level of understanding.
The CCL was intended to harmonize China’s domestic w and foreign
contract laws. In doing so, the drafters relied on Western-style laws such as the
CISG and the PICC. Since the CISG was adopted by China in 1988, it was a
natural source for “modernizing” or “westernizing” China’s domestic contract
law. However, the amalgamation of rules from different sources and legal
traditions in creating the CCL resulted in unavoidable problems. Two problems
relating to the CCL can be described as the “comprehension problem” and the
“comprehensiveness problem.” The comprehension problem relates to the
inherent difficulty of transplanting foreign laws from one legal system to
another. The severing of rules and principles from the social, economic, and
political context of their development undercuts the clarity of their meaning.
Hugh Collins noted an “objection to transplants of legal rules insists that legal
concepts fit into clusters of concepts, which together comprise a coherent and
17. See Han Shiyuan, Culpa in Contrahendo in Chinese Contract Law, 6 TSINGHUA CHINA L.
REV. 157, 158 (2014).
18. Id. at 158-59.
19. Id. at 158.
20. Id.
21. UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS (2010)
[hereinafter PICC].
22. COMMISSION ON EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW, PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN CONTRACT
LAW, pts. 1 & 2 (Ole Lando & Hugh Beale eds., combined and revised ed. 2000) [hereinafter PECL].
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consistent set of rules and principles for the regulation of some aspect of social
life.”23 Therefore, transplanting a subset of a cluster of rules, or in China’s case,
taking rules from numerous sources, has had a fundamental impact on the
CCL’s comprehensibility. This use of a patchwork of different sources has led to
omissions or gaps in the CCL, making it less comprehensive than it could have
been.
Thus, the CCL has suffered a crisis of meaning because it was the product
of partial transplants of rules uprooted from their overall conceptual schemes.
China, like the countries of the former Soviet Union, adopted Western-style
contract and commercial codes but has struggled to develop court systems that
could place the new codes into their societal contexts. This is largely due to the
courts’ failure to understand the conceptual scheme behind those rules and to
adapt that scheme appropriately to a new context. This type of legal know-how
takes generations of legal education and practice to develop. It is beyond the
scope of this Article to determine how far along the Chinese courts have moved
in interpreting and applying the CCL in a consistent way.
The second problem of legal transplants—the comprehensiveness
problem—is related to the subject of the current undertaking. No code,
especially not one created by using numerous foreign sources, provides a
complete set of rules that covers every possible real-life scenario. There are
interstitial gaps and inconsistencies within the web of rules that make up
contract law. These gaps are eventually worked out by the courts. However, the
separation of the formal legal text from its surrounding jurisprudence makes it
more difficult for the courts in the transplanting country to resolve the resulting
interpretive problems. The next section will discuss in more detail these
problems of transplantation in relationship to the creation of the CCL.
A. China’s Double Transplantation and Resulting Problems
As noted above, China was one of the original eleven countries, along with
the United States, to adopt the CISG. As an international convention, the CISG
is not strictly an example of transplantation. Countries often adopt conventions
in order to harmonize law internationally. Classic examples include the carriage
of goods by sea conventions (Hague Rules and Hague-Visby rules) and the
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards
(New York Convention) (over 160 signatory countries).24 The CISG is the most
successful attempt at harmonizing international private substantive law with
eighty-four signatory countries and climbing.25 While it is not a traditional

23. H. Collins, Methods and Aims of Comparative Contract Law, 11 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD.
396, 398 (1991).
24. See Status of Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards,
UNITED
NATIONS
COMM’N
INT’L
TRADE
Law,
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/NYConvention_status.html.
(last
visited Nov. 1, 2015).
25. See Status of United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of

http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/bjil/vol34/iss1/5
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.15779/Z38756T

52

BERKELEY JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 34:1

example of transplantation, the CISG can nonetheless be seen as a pseudotransplant because it was primarily crafted from European civil law and AngloAmerican common law. As such, existing jurisprudence in the longstanding
European free market legal systems equipped European countries with a high
degree of judicial expertise for implementing the CISG. Also, substantial
numbers of commentaries were written on the new law in a short period of time.
These resources were not readily available in China. However, as noted above,
Chinese arbitral tribunals have shown a surprising adeptness in applying the
CISG.
The idea of double transplantation refers to the transplantation of foreign
law into another legal system and then the subsequent transplantation of that law
by the transplanting country to another area of its law. In the present case, the
double transplantation involves the adoption of the CISG as China’s
international sales law and China’s subsequent use of the CISG as a major
source in drafting the CCL. The drafters of the CCL were heavily influenced by
academic research, including studies of contract laws in the “United States,
Canada, Germany, the United Kingdom, Europe and Australia.”26 Thus, the retransplantation of the CISG and the use of a variety of foreign law sources in
drafting the CCL help explain the existence of inconsistencies and gaps within
the CCL, as well as the difficulty of its interpretation and application by Chinese
courts. The gaps and inconsistencies in the CCL will need to be resolved
through an interpretive process. This process has begun with scholarly
commentaries offering different interpretive “solutions” to the problems posed
by the CCL. The Supreme People’s Court, the highest court in China, has also
issued interpretive guidelines to help guide the lower courts in developing
uniform interpretations.27
This Article will enter these academic discussions by highlighting three
problematic areas of the CCL—late acceptance, anticipatory breach, and the
right to cure. It will also make recommendations on how best to solve these
shortcomings. The broader point of the Article is to study the issues, problems,
and solutions transplantation and reception of foreign law pose when combined
and introduced into a foreign legal system. The next section will briefly review
comparative law methodology as a way to understand and apply the CCL.

Goods,
UNITED
NATIONS
COMM’N
INT’L
TRADE
Law,
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/sale_goods/1980CISG_status.html. (last visited
Nov. 1, 2015).
26. CHOW, supra note 7, at 345.
27. See, e.g., Interpretation I of the Supreme People’s Court of Several Issues Concerning the
Application of the Contract Law of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated by Sup. People’s
Ct., Dec. 19, 1999, effective Dec. 29, 1999), CLI.3.23702(EN) (Lawinfochina) (China);
Interpretation of the Supreme People’s Court on Issues Concerning the Application of Law for the
Trial of Cases of Disputes over Sales Contracts (Sup. People’s Ct., May 10, 2012, effective July 1,
2012), CLI.3.176318 (EN) (Lawinfochina) (China).
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B. Comparative Law as an Avenue to Law Reform
Comparative contract law research has been conducted for a number of
reasons. First, it has been used as a teaching device to educate students on
different legal systems, typically by focusing on the differences between the
civil and common law systems. A more dense literature can be found in the
comparative analysis of different civil law systems, especially between the
Germanic and Franco legal traditions.28 Less literature is found comparing
differences among common law systems.29 Second, comparative contract law
has been used as a source in the drafting of international law instruments. The
most important example of this is the drafting of the CISG,30 which drew
heavily from common and civil law systems. In addition to providing a degree
of supranational harmonization, the CISG has also been used as a comparative
law instrument in the reformation or modernization of national laws.31 Third,
comparative law can be used in legal reform at the national level. This includes
various degrees of use, ranging from mere influence to “legal transplant.”32 It is
this third use of comparative law that will be the focus of this Article.
1.

Perils and Virtues of the Comparative Law Methodology

Professor Watson lists a number of “perils” and “virtues” of comparative
law methodology. Under perils he lists superficiality, incompetency,
unsystematic study, and temporality.33
Watson’s list of perils is supported by intuition. First, unless a researcher is
fully acculturated in both of the legal systems being compared, a degree of
superficiality is inherent in such research. Second, there is a risk that a
researcher from one legal system comparing its law to a foreign legal system’s
law may misinterpret the foreign law being compared, a kind of incompetency
problem. Third, a selectivity problem exists because a systematic comparison of
entire legal systems is beyond most researchers’ abilities or scope. Thus, the
researcher will analyze specific legal rules, the selection of which will be at least

28. See, e.g., H. PATRICK GLENN, LEGAL TRADITIONS OF THE WORLD 125-69 (2d ed. 2004)
(“A Civil Law Tradition: The Centrality of the Person”); ZWEIGERT & KÖTZ, supra note 1, at 74131, 132-79 (“The Romanistic Legal Family” and “The Germanic Legal Family”).
29. But see, e.g., COMMERCIAL CONTRACT LAW: TRANSATLANTIC PERSPECTIVES (Larry
DiMatteo et al. eds., 2013) (comparing the common law systems of the United Kingdom and United
States); COMPARATIVE CONTRACT LAW: BRITISH AND AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES (Larry DiMatteo &
Martin Hogg eds., 2015) (same).
30. CISG, supra note 4. See generally INTERNATIONAL SALES LAW: A GLOBAL CHALLENGE
(Larry A. DiMatteo ed., 2014) (comprehensive review of the CISG and its application).
31. The CISG has heavily influenced the modernization of contract and sales law in China,
Germany, The Netherlands, and is likely to have similar influences in the revisions of the French,
Japanese, and Spanish Civil Codes.
32. MATHIAS SIEMS, COMPARATIVE LAW 191-220 (2014). Professor Siems says that there are
positive and negative views of the integrity of comparative law. The positive view is exemplified in
the work of Alan Watson. Siems refers to Watson as the “father of legal transplants.” Id. at 195.
33. WATSON, supra note 1, at chs. 2-3.
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partially subjective in nature. This can lead to a degree of arbitrariness in the
conclusions reached and a danger of generalizing from those conclusions to
characterize the greater body of law. Fourth, disparity in economic and legal
development between the two countries being compared may lead to a bias
toward the more highly developed law or country. This may prove troublesome
because a given law may be efficient at one stage of development but become
inefficient at a higher stage of development. For example, a strict product
liability law may not make much sense in a poor and underdeveloped country
but may make sense in a highly industrialized and developed one. The two legal
systems are simply at different points on the evolutionary path.
Additional perils also exist. Homeward trend is an issue,34 which occurs
when a researcher from a different legal system examines the rules or lack of
rules of another legal system and is subjectively prejudiced by the legal
concepts of law found in the researcher’s own legal system. This does not have
to be an issue of temporality since the two countries being compared might be at
the same level of development. The comparatist must also fully recognize the
multiple interlocking systems that make up a society (economic, cultural, legal,
religious, and so forth).35 Some societies may allocate certain issues to the legal
realm, while others may deal with such issues through non-legal systems. The
separation of legal rules from these interlocking systems commonly results in
misunderstandings regarding the meanings of those rules and how they should
be applied.
The authors believe the virtues of comparative law are numerous.
Comparative law may be used as a method to better understand the evolution of
law. It may also be used as a powerful tool for reforming law, as it provides a
survey of options used in other systems. Finally, comparative law may be used
to analyze the transplantation of laws from one system to another, and the
subsequent application of the laws in the receiving system.
Watson notes the formal rules being transplanted are subject to
interpretation by the courts of the receiving country. This sudden disconnect
between text and context means the rules “may equally operate to different
effect in the two societies, even though [they are] expressed in apparently
similar terms.”36 This is especially the case when introducing a Western, highly
formalized law into a country with non-Western economic, social, and cultural

34. The notion of “homeward trend bias” has been used in relation to the interpretation of the
CISG by different national court systems. See Ingeborg Schwenzer, Divergent Interpretations:
Reasons and Solutions, in INTERNATIONAL SALES LAW: A GLOBAL CHALLENGE 102, 103 (Larry A.
DiMatteo ed., 2014) (identifying homeward trend as “interpreting the provisions of the CISG
according to existing or merely presumed domestic counterparts”).
35. See Daniel Berkowitz et al., The Transplant Effect, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 163 (2003) (noting
that the success of transplants is dependent on conforming to existing social values). See also
Graham Mayeda, Appreciate the Difference: The Role of Different Domestic Norms in Law and
Development Reform: Lessons from Japan and China, 51 MCGILL L.J. 547 (2006) (noting the
complexity of law reform in different normative systems).
36. WATSON, supra note 1, at 20.
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norms. In China’s case, a tradition exists that is heavily based on
Confucianism.37 In such a system, formalized private law has historically played
a far lesser role than cultural norms found in business relationships and resorting
to the courts as a means of dispute resolution is disfavored. One example of this
tradition is the Chinese concept of guanxi in which business transactions are
regulated by informal social and status-based relational norms. Guanxi places a
great deal of importance on respect, reputation, and relational networks and not
on the enforcement of formalized institutional support systems, such as
contractual rights.38 Thus, a comparative law analysis should also seek to study
the effects of a transplanted law on existing social and cultural systems.
2.

One Methodology, Two Approaches

There are two traditional approaches in comparative law studies—the
common core approach and the “better rules” approach.39 The first approach,
championed by Continental European scholars such as Rodolfo Sacco at the
University of Turin40 and Rudolf Schlesinger at Cornell University in the 1950s
and 1960s, looks at the commonalities among different legal systems.41 The
second approach analyzes the differences between legal systems and assesses
which of their different rules are “better.” Oxford Professor Hugh Collins
describes this comparative law methodology as a “utilitarian approach to
comparative law . . . [which] seeks through a comparison of the legal rules and
techniques of different jurisdictions the best solutions to legal problems. The
aim is to identify better solutions in foreign legal systems and then to
recommend their incorporation into domestic law.”42 This Article will use both
approaches. A comparative analysis will be performed on the rules for late
acceptance by comparing the rules of major legal systems and international law
instruments. A less in-depth use of comparative law will be used in the sections
on anticipatory breach and the right to cure.

37. See Patricia Pattison & Daniel Herron, The Mountains are High and the Emperor is Far
Away: Sanctity of Contract in China, 40 AM. BUS. L.J. 459, 478-79 (2003).
38. Howard Davies et al., Guanxi and Business Practices in the People’s Republic of China,
in CHINESE CULTURE, ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR, AND INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS
MANAGEMENT 41, 43 (Ilan Alon ed., 2003) (“Without guanxi, one simply cannot get anything
done.”). See also Lee Mei Yi & Paul Ellis, Insider-Outsider Perspective of Guanxi, 43 BUS.
HORIZONS 25 (2000) (noting the pros and cons of guanxi).
39. See generally Ugo Mattei, The Comparative Jurisprudence of Schlesinger and Sacco: A
Study in Legal Influence, in RETHINKING THE MASTERS OF COMPARATIVE LAW, supra note 12, at
238.
40. Rodolfo Sacco is one of Europe’s most famous comparative law scholars. See id.
41. R. SCHLESINGER, COMPARATIVE LAW: CASES, TEXTS & MATERIALS (1950). See
generally UGO MATTEI ET AL., SCHLESINGER’S COMPARATIVE LAW (2009). See also Richard
Buxbaum & Ugo Mattei, Rudolph B. Schlesinger 1909-1996, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 1, 1-4 (1997).
42. Collins, supra note 23, at 397.
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II.
CASE STUDIES: GAPS AND INCONSISTENCIES IN THE CCL
Formation of a contract is generally determined under an offer-acceptance
paradigm.43 The CCL adopts this widely held model of contract formation.44
Before proceeding with the analysis of the CCL’s late acceptance rules or lack
thereof, it is important to state the obvious: contract law is a rules-based system.
One area of contract law where this rules-based system is extensive is in the
offer-acceptance rules of contract formation. The rule density in this area
includes primary rules, exceptions to those rules, and exceptions to the
exceptions. A comprehensive set of such rules answers the core questions of
whether a contract has been formed, when it has been formed, and the content of
the concluded contract. Weaknesses in these rules prevent the law from
efficiently answering these questions. Such a weakness can be found in the
CCL’s late acceptance rules.45
Contracts are formed in a variety of ways, including a bilateral contract
(exchange of promises), a unilateral contract (offer promise followed by
acceptance by conduct or performance), or an implied-in-fact contract (conduct
followed by conduct).46 The traditional contract model involves an exchange of
promises either orally or in written form. The common contract formation
paradigm involves the exchange of offer and acceptance,47 and common and
civil laws have developed precise offer-acceptance rules relating to the
formation of contracts. Under these rules, acceptance is the key communication
that creates binding obligations. Generally, the civil and common laws have
similar rules for the conclusion of a contract. However, the two systems have
notably different rules relating to the time when an acceptance becomes
effective. According to civil law, a contract is formed when an acceptance is
received by the offeror.48 By contrast, a contract is concluded under common
law upon the sending or dispatch of the acceptance (as long as the transmission
of the acceptance is by reasonable means). Thus, a contract under common law
is formed at an earlier point in time, which limits the time during which the
offeror may revoke the offer.49 Despite the difference in when an acceptance is
43. Parviz Owsia, The Notion and Function of Offer and Acceptance under French and
English Law, 66 TUL. L. REV. 871, 872 (1992) (“The most common mechanism of contract
formation, offer and acceptance, is used as a standard tool under both [common and civil law]
systems.”).
44. CHOW, supra note 7, at 350 (stating that provisions of the CCL “borrow heavily from
foreign law and [are] based upon an offer and acceptance model”).
45. See discussion infra Part III.A.
46. E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS 205-06, 253-54 (3d ed. 2004)
[hereinafter FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS]
47. But see PETER HUBER & ALASTAIR MULLIS, THE CISG: A NEW TEXTBOOK FOR
STUDENTS AND PRACTITIONERS 100-02 (2007) (“Conclusion of contract otherwise than by offer and
acceptance”).
48. PECL, supra note 22, art. 2:205 n.2.
49. FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS, supra note 46, at 337-38.
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considered effective, the offer-acceptance rules of common and civil law
systems, including rules dealing with late acceptance, show a high degree of
consistency.
The next section examines the rules and rationales relating to acceptance in
the context of the CCL. It will discuss and analyze the late acceptance rules in
the civil and common law systems, along with the late acceptance rules found in
the CISG. It then questions the lack of similar rules in the CCL. It concludes that
the CCL should be reformed to more fully address scenarios involving late
acceptance, including late dispatch of acceptance and belated delivery of
acceptance after a timely dispatch. Such reform would not only fill a gap in the
CCL, but would also make the CCL consistent with the CISG.
A. Late Acceptance Rules
The lack of an adequate set of late acceptance rules in the CCL is puzzling
given that the CISG incorporates generally recognized late acceptance rules.
Again, the CISG is the law of China in international sales and was used as a
primary source in writing the CCL. The CCL represents an exception to most
contract law regimes in terms of not possessing a complete set of rules dealing
with the issue of late acceptance. Late acceptance rules are important because
they directly impact if and when a contract is formed. Late acceptance and how
the law responds to it raise a number of important questions. Do the reasons for
late acceptance—belated dispatch or delayed transmission—require different
rules? Is late acceptance itself something that can bind a contract? Or, is late
acceptance a rejection of the offer, becoming instead a counteroffer? Legal
systems answer these questions differently, leading to different real-world
outcomes.
This part of the Article provides a comparative analysis of late acceptance
rules in German law, American law (UCC and common law of contracts), and
the CISG. The Article divides the existing rules into two types—”counteroffer
theory” rules and “effective acceptance theory” rules. It then reviews Chinese
law and recommends the adoption of new default rules to guide the reformation
of the CCL.
Both the civil and common law systems base contractual obligations on the
parties’ agreement to enter into a legally binding contract. As a general matter, a
contract becomes binding when an acceptance reaches the offeror (except under
the common law). Most international sales and contract instruments have
adopted the civil law’s receipt rule.50
Common law’s dispatch rule limits the problem of late acceptance because
the contract is binding, even if acceptance is lost or delayed in transmission, as
long as it was properly sent within a reasonable period of time. However, if the
dispatch is not proper—not transmitted in compliance with requirements set out
in the offer, not sent by a reasonable means of transmission, not properly
50.

See, e.g., CISG, supra note 4; PICC, supra note 21.
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addressed or posted, or not sent within a reasonable time—the contract is not
binding until received by the offeree. If acceptance is not received due to one of
the above reasons within the time stated in the offer or within a reasonable time,
then it is considered a late acceptance.51 Another way of understanding late
acceptance is to understand that offers self-terminate after a period of time. If
acceptance is not sent under common law or received under civil law within a
reasonable period of time, there cannot be a contract because the offer has
lapsed. However, most legal systems provide special rules in cases of late
acceptance. The following sections will address these rules.
1.

Late Acceptance: Counteroffer or Effective Acceptance?

The first rule of effective acceptance is that it must be unconditional and
unequivocal. In short, the terms and conditions of the acceptance must mimic
those of the offer. Under common law, acceptance must be a “mirror image” of
the offer.52 The “mirror image” rule is associated with the common law doctrine
that considers differences in the terms and conditions of the acceptance, relative
to the offer, as a rejection of the offer. Only when acceptance meets all the
conditions of the offer can it constitute an effective acceptance. Therefore, if the
offeror has fixed a specific time or period for acceptance, the offeree must
accept within that period of time.53 If a time or period has not been fixed in the
offer, contract law implies the offeree must accept within a reasonable period of
time. If the offeree does not respond to the offer within a reasonable period of
time, the response will be considered a late acceptance.54
As a general rule, late acceptance, whether due to late dispatch or due to
delay in transmission, is treated as a counteroffer that gives or returns the power
to make a contract to the original offeror. The American Law Institute’s
Restatement (Second) of Contracts (Restatement),55 the American Uniform
Commercial Code (UCC), and the CISG provide similar rules in cases of late
acceptance. If it is obvious to the offeror the acceptance was timely and properly
dispatched but was delayed in transmission, the offeror must notify the offeree
of the lateness of its receipt in order to prevent the formation of a contract.56 If
late acceptance is due to a belated dispatch and not a problem in transmission,
then the offeror can treat the offer as lapsed, and the late dispatch constitutes a
51. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 70 (1981).
52. The “mirror image” rule is associated with the common law doctrine that considers
differences in the terms and conditions of the acceptance, relative to the offer, as a rejection of the
offer.
53. See, e.g., BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB][CIVIL CODE], Jan. 2, 2002,
BUNDESGESETZBLAFT TEIL I [BGB. I] 42, last amended Oct. 1, 2013, § 148, translation at
http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_bgb/ (Ger.) (“If the offeror has determined a period of
time for the acceptance of the offer, the acceptance may only take place within this period.”).
54. HEIN KÖTZ & AXEL FLESSNER, EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW 33 (1997).
55. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS (1981).
56. See JOHN CALAMARI & JOSEPH PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 89 (4th ed. 1998);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 70 cmt. a (1981).
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rejection of the offer.57 However, the offeror can accept the late acceptance by
sending a notice to the offeree of the offeror’s intention to recognize the
acceptance as binding the contract. The question then becomes whether the
contract is formed when the late acceptance was sent (common law’s dispatch
rule), when the late acceptance was received (civil law and CISG’s receipt rule),
when the offeror dispatches a notification of effective late acceptance (in the
case of a belated dispatch), or when the offeree receives the notification sent by
the offeror. This issue will be discussed later in the Article. These general rules
relating to late acceptance provide the context in which this Article reviews the
CCL.
2.

Late Acceptance by Late Performance

In a unilateral contract, the offeror invites the offeree to accept by conduct
or performance. This “invitation” may be express or implied. Implied
acceptance by performance may be based on prior dealings, trade usage, or
business customs.58 Three questions must be answered: (1) What type of
conduct or performance is needed to bind the contract—beginning performance
(such as beginning the manufacture of the goods) or completing performance
(such as sending existing goods), (2) what happens if the performance is
delayed, or delayed after it has begun, and (3) will either scenario be considered
equivalent to late acceptance in a bilateral contract? The UCC only requires the
offeree to begin performance for the conduct to be considered a binding
acceptance.59 The CISG indicates that complete or near complete performance is
required.60
Restatement sections 45 and 50(2) state acceptance by performance
“requires that at least part of what the offer requests be performed.”61 This is the
case when the offer is one for a unilateral contract in which acceptance can only
be effectuated by performance and not by promise.62 Restatement section 62 is
more explicit by noting that the tendering or beginning of performance is an
acceptance by performance when the offer provides the offeree the choice of
accepting by promise or performance.63 The rationale given in both cases is that

57. CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 56, at 89 (“[I]f an offer lapses before an acceptance
becomes effective, it would seem to follow that the late acceptance is an offer”).
58. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 32, 53 (1981); U.C.C. §2-206 (AM. LAW
INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2014).
59. See also LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1939 (2015) (“When an offeror invites an offeree to
accept by performance and, according to usage or the nature or the terms of the contract, it is
contemplated that the performance will be completed if commenced, a contract is formed when the
offeree begins the requested performance.”). See also U.C.C. § 2-206(2) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF.
LAW COMM’N 2014) (“The beginning of a requested performance is a reasonable mode of
acceptance.”).
60. CISG, supra note 4, art. 25 (fundamental breach).
61. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS (1981), §§ 45, 50(2).
62. Id. § 45 cmt. a.
63. Id. § 63.
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the beginning of performance “operates as a promise to render complete
performance.”64 Acceptance by performance can be especially important under
the UCC, which requires a writing (most notably under the statute of frauds) to
create an enforceable contract in almost all cases.65 A notable exception to the
writing requirement exists for the purchase of “specially manufactured goods”66
where there is “either a substantial beginning of their manufacture or
commitments for their procurement.”67 The question remains whether late
acceptance rules apply to unilateral contracts as they do in bilateral contracts if
an offeree unreasonably delays the beginning of performance. The most rational
answer is that promise and conduct are both methods of acceptance and,
therefore, late acceptance rules are applicable. If aware of the belated
performance, the offeror should be able to treat it as a counteroffer that he is free
to reject. A caveat would be the case where, despite the delay in performance,
the offeree still has the ability to perform an on-time delivery. In practice, the
parties would likely communicate regarding the progress of performance. If
progress is unduly delayed and the parties assume a contract was formed, an
alternative would be for the non-breaching party to declare an anticipatory
repudiation and sue for damages.
3.

Survey of National and International Rules of Late Acceptance

The German Civil Code (BGB) and American common law will be used as
representatives of their respective legal systems. This review will also consider
the rules found in the UCC and the CISG.
a.

German Law

In German law, the reason for the belated acceptance—be it belated
dispatch or a delay in transmission—is important to the application of late
acceptance rules. The BGB’s late acceptance rules are found in Articles 149 and
150.68 BGB Article 150, entitled “Law and Altered Acceptance,” provides the
general rule that “late acceptance of an offer is considered to be a new offer.”69
Traditionally, civil law provides that late acceptance due to belated dispatch is a
counteroffer, which the original offeror is free to accept, reject, or ignore.70

64. A caveat to the acceptance by performance rule is when the offeree sends non-conforming
goods not as an acceptance but as an accommodation. In that case, the offeror is free to accept or
reject the goods. See U.C.C. § 2-206(1)(b) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2014) (“[A]
shipment of nonconforming goods does not constitute an acceptance if the seller seasonably notifies
the buyer that the shipment is offered only as an accommodation to the buyer.”).
65. Id. § 2-201.
66. Specially manufactured goods of the type that are specifically made for the buyer and “are
not suitable for the sale to others in the ordinary course of seller’s business.” Id. §2-201(3)(a).
67. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 62 (1981).
68. BGB art. 149-50 (Ger.).
69. Id. art. 150 (The late acceptance of an offer is considered to be a new offer.).
70. See COMMENTARY ON THE UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
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However, BGB Article 149 (“Late Receipt of a Declaration of Acceptance”)
places an obligation on the offeror to respond to a late acceptance if the
acceptance “was sent in such a way that it would have reached him in time if it
had been forwarded in the usual way” and “if the offeror ought to have
recognized” the acceptance had been properly sent.71 In such cases, the offeror
is required to “notify the acceptor [offeree] of the delay” within a reasonable
period of time. If the offeror unduly delays in sending the notification, “the
acceptance is deemed not to be late” and a contract is concluded.72
b.

American Common Law

The American common law of contracts is the law of the individual state
court systems. The basic principles and concepts of the common law are similar
across the states, but their interpretation and application may vary. This creates
majority and minority views and, in some cases, a series of minority views
without a mainstream or majority view. In sum, the same terminology and rules
are applied with different outcomes. The Restatement may be considered a more
stable representation of American common law because it provides concise
descriptions of common law rules while providing normative insights into what
the law should be. American courts often reference Restatement provisions, and
in some cases adopt Restatement rules. This phenomenon confirms the
prescriptive role the Restatement plays in American law.73 Therefore, the
Restatement will be used as representative of American common law.
The Restatement fails to provide late acceptance rules. This is
predominantly due to the fact that late acceptances—whether due to a belated
dispatch or a delay in transmission due to the fault of the offeree—are treated as
counteroffers.74 However, if acceptance is properly dispatched in a timely
fashion but is delayed or lost in transmission, a contract is formed at the time of
dispatch under the common law’s dispatch or “mailbox” rule. Restatement

CONTRACTS (PICC) 27273 (Stefan Vogenauer & Jan Kleinheisterkamp eds., 2009) [hereinafter
COMMENTARY ON THE PICC].
71. BGB art. 149 (Ger.)
If a declaration of acceptance received late by the offeror was sent in such a way that it would have
reached him in time if it had been forwarded in the usual way, and if the offeror ought to have
recognized this, he must notify the acceptor of the delay after receipt of the declaration without
undue delay, unless this has already been done. If he delays the sending of the notification, the
acceptance is deemed not to be late.
72. Id.
73. A classic example is the serial referencing of Section 90 of the Restatement in court
decisions. Section 90 deals with liability predicated upon detrimental reliance, commonly referred to
as promissory estoppel. Thus, liability premised solely on the breach of a promise has been
supplemented by liability based upon reliance. Reliance damages may be awarded in cases of noncontractual promises (one-way promise). See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1981).
E. Allan Farnsworth notes that: “Restatement Second [§ 90] states that recovery ‘may be limited as
justice requires,’ language that is generally invoked in limiting recovery to damages based on the
reliance interest.” See FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS, supra note 46, at 180.
74. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 70 (1981).
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section 63 states that an acceptance “is operative and completes the
manifestation of intent as soon as put out of the offeree’s possession, without
regard to whether it ever reaches the offeror.”75 Ancillary to the dispatch rule is
that the acceptance must be sent by means dictated by the offer.76 If the offer
does not provide for the means of transmission, then the offeree must send the
acceptance using a reasonable means of transmission under the circumstances,77
and the acceptance has to be “properly” dispatched (for example, correct mailing
address and postage).78 However, Restatement section 57 makes an exception
where an acceptance is improperly dispatched but is received “within the time in
which a properly dispatched acceptance would normally have arrived” so that it
is deemed to have been “operative upon dispatch.”79 Thus, an improper dispatch
of the acceptance will delay the application of the “mailbox” rule pending
receipt, but if the communication is nonetheless reasonably received, then the
“mailbox” rule goes into effect. The time of contract formation is then the time
when the acceptance was dispatched. In the case of a delay in transmission, the
fact that an acceptance is received unreasonably late is irrelevant since the
contract has already been formed. The remaining issue involving the late
sending of the acceptance is whether the offeror may accept the late acceptance.
Restatement section 70 answers this in the negative, stating a belatedly sent
acceptance is a counteroffer.80
Despite the lack of necessity for late acceptance rules, a density of offeracceptance rules can be seen in Restatement sections 49 and 54. In the case of a
unilateral contract where the offeror invites acceptance by performance, the
offeree is not required to provide notification of the commencement of
performance.81 However, Restatement section 54 places such an obligation to
give notice of commencement when the offeree “has reason to know that the
offeror has no adequate means of learning of the performance with reasonable
promptness and certainty.”82 The offeree must exercise due diligence to notify
the offeror of acceptance unless “the offer indicates that notification of
acceptance is not required.”83 This issue of the offeree providing notice of
performance in a unilateral contract is an unsettled issue in the CCL.
Another issue relates to delays in the transmission of an offer. Is the time
provided for acceptance of the offer extended for a period of time equivalent to
the delay in the transmission of the offer? The Restatement answers the question
in the negative: “the period within which a contract can be created by

75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Id. § 63.
Id. § 63(a).
Id. § 65.
Id. § 66.
Id. § 57.
Id. § 70.
Id. § 54.
Id.
Id. § 54(2)(a-c).
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acceptance is not thereby extended if the offeree knows or has reason to know of
the delay.”84 However, if the delay is due to the fault of the offeror and the
“offeree neither knows nor has reason to know that there has been delay, a
contract can be created by acceptance within the period which would have been
permissible if the offer had been dispatched at the time that its arrival seems to
indicate.”85 A reasonable interpretation of this phrase is that the time for
acceptance is extended for a time equivalent to the delay.
c.

Uniform Commercial Code

The UCC does not provide a full regime of offer-acceptance rules and does
not contain late acceptance rules, except in cases where the offeror invites
acceptance by performance (notice must still be given) and where silence can be
a means of acceptance.86 Part of this absence is alleviated by the written
confirmation rule,87 the writing exception for specially manufactured goods,88
and the recognition of unilateral contracts.89 The informality of transactions
involving the sale of goods is evident in the core section on contract formation.
Section 2-204 states a contract may be formed “in any manner sufficient to show
agreement, including [by] conduct.”90 It further states an agreement to enter into
a contract may be recognized “even though the moment of its making is
undetermined.”91 Additionally, unlike the common law of contracts, a contract
may be formed even if not all the material terms have been agreed to, as long as
the parties intended to form a contract and “there is a reasonably certain basis
for giving an appropriate remedy.”92 Since the UCC is not considered a
comprehensive or a complete preemption of the common law, the common law
is used to fill in the gaps in the UCC.
Regarding acceptance by performance, a unilateral contract can be formed
by the conduct of the offeree in two instances. If the offer invites acceptance by
conduct or performance, the type of conduct needed to bind the contract depends
on the circumstances. If the goods exist, then the offeree may accept by prompt
shipment of the goods. If the goods are not in existence or are not in hand, then
the “beginning of performance” is a reasonable method of acceptance.93
However, the UCC qualifies this method by requiring that the offeror receive

84. Id. § 49.
85. Id.
86. U.C.C. § 2-206 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2014).
87. Id. § 2-201(2).
88. Id. § 2-201(3) (a).
89. Id. (“[U]nder circumstances which reasonably indicate that the goods are for the buyer,
has made either a substantial beginning of their manufacture or commitments for their
procurement”).
90. Id. § 2-204(1).
91. Id. § 2-204(2).
92. Id. § 2-204(3).
93. Id. § 2-201(a).
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notice of the beginning of performance. It states “an offeror who is not notified
of acceptance within a reasonable time may treat the offer as having lapsed
before acceptance.”94 Thus, the contract is created by conduct but the offeree
must still notify the offeror of the beginning of performance.
The requirement that the offeree notify the offeror of the beginning of
performance in the case of acceptance by performance raises the same issues
seen in the late acceptance by promise scenario. What if the notification is
delayed in transmission and is received by the offeror belatedly? If the notice is
sent belatedly, can a contract still be formed? The fact that Section 2-206(2)
states that the offeror of a late notice “may” treat the offer as lapsed implies the
offeror may also consider the contract as formed. Does the offeror have any
responsibility to notify the offeree of the late notice in the case of a delay in
transmission? The UCC does not provide answers to these questions. However,
in the case where the offeror treats the offer as lapsed while knowing the offeree
is continuing in its performance, it seems the offeror would be obligated to
notify the offeree of the nonexistence of the contract. Again, the common law’s
offer-acceptance rules would apply to UCC transactions. For example, UCC
Section 2-206 does not expressly preclude the offeror from revoking the offer
after the beginning of performance but before receiving notice. A comment to
Section 2-206 notes the importance of the common law in such situations:
“Nothing in this section bars the possibility that under the common law
performance begun may have an intermediate effect of temporarily barring
revocation of the offer.”95 This is supported by analogy to the dispatch or
“mailbox” rule that dictates a contract is formed at the time the acceptance is
dispatched. In the acceptance by performance scenario, the beginning of
performance is the equivalent to a dispatch. Thus, the parties have entered into a
binding contract, conditional on the offeree sending the required notice. Under
German law, if there is any doubt as to whether a contract has come into
existence, even if there has been a commencement of performance, the contract
will be judged as having not come into existence.96
d.

United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International
Sale of Goods

The American common law and UCC approach view a late acceptance as a
counteroffer. Some civil law countries also take this approach. For example,
Article 1393 of the Civil Code of Québec states “[a]n acceptance which does not
correspond substantially to the offer or which is received by the offeror after the
offer has lapsed does not constitute acceptance.”97 In contrast, the Italian Civil
Code holds out the possibility that a late acceptance may still be an effective

94.
95.
96.
97.

Id. § 2-206(2).
Id. § 2-206 cmt. 3.
BGB § 154(1) (Ger.).
Civil Code of Québec, S.Q. 1991, c 64, art 1393 (Can.).

Published by Berkeley Law Scholarship Repository, 2016

2016]

WESTERN CONTRACT LAW

65

acceptance.98 The CISG adopted the Italian law approach as stated in CISG
Article 21, “A late acceptance is nevertheless effective as an acceptance if
without delay the offeror orally so informs the offeree or dispatches a notice to
that effect.”
If a letter or other writing containing a late acceptance shows that it has
been sent in such circumstances that if its transmission had been normal it would
have reached the offeror in due time, the late acceptance is effective as an
acceptance unless, without delay, the offeror orally informs the offeree that he
considers his offer as having lapsed or dispatches a notice to that effect.99
Accordingly, if the offeree is informed of the effectiveness of his late
acceptance, the “lapsed” offer remains in force and leads to the formation of a
contract through the late acceptance.100 This rule allows a late acceptance to be
effective retroactively, so that the originally proposed contract is concluded at
the time the late acceptance reached the offeror. The CISG’s late acceptance rule
is classified in this Article as the “effective acceptance theory” approach, which
is explained further below.
4.

Comparing Counteroffer and Effective Acceptance Approaches

What are the differences between counteroffer and effective acceptance
theories of late acceptance? First, the nature of the original offeror’s reply to the
late acceptance is different. Under counteroffer theory, the late acceptance
cannot be an effective acceptance. The offeror considers such late acceptance as
a counteroffer and may or may not “accept” it. The Restatement provides “[a]
late acceptance may be an offer which can be accepted by the original
offeror.”101 For example, “A” offers to sell “B” a tractor for $12,000 and states
he needs to have B’s answer within three days. On the fourth day, B telephones
A to accept. B’s response constitutes a late acceptance and a rejection of A’s
offer. However, A may choose to accept B’s response as a counteroffer and
respond, in a timely manner, indicating his intent to accept B’s offer. In this
case, the original offeror’s reply is an “acceptance” to the counteroffer (late
acceptance). However, the original offeror cannot at his election regard or
render the late acceptance an effective acceptance.102 The contract is formed
when the original offeror dispatches a notice of acceptance of the original
offeree’s counteroffer.
In effective acceptance theory, the original offeror may consider the late
acceptance as an effective acceptance if the offeror, without delay, notifies the
offeree to that effect. The offeror’s reply is in essence a declaratory notice

98. Art. 1326 Codice civile [C.c.] (It.).
99. CISG, supra note 4, art. 21.
100. See HUBER & MULLIS, supra note 47, at 97-98.
101. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS (1981) § 70 cmt. b (late acceptance).
102. See id. § 70 cmt. a (“Nor can the original offeror ‘waive’ his right to reject, or at his
election regard the counter-offer as an acceptance.”).
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instead of an acceptance.103 Such a declaratory notice can be seen as activating
the effectiveness of the late acceptance and reactivating the lapsed “offer” at the
same time. Schlechtriem and Schwenzer assert: “[t]he offeror’s declaration of
approval therefore cures a late acceptance, even if his declaration is lost or
arrives late.”104 This interpretation implies the contract is formed retroactively to
the time of receipt of the late acceptance upon the dispatch of the offeror’s
notice.
Second, the risks of the original offeror’s reply are different. As mentioned
above, according to the counteroffer theory the original offeror’s reply to the
late acceptance is considered an “acceptance.” The general rule (civil law and
CISG) is that a declaration of intent (offer or acceptance) becomes effective at
the point when this declaration reaches the other party.105 Therefore, if the
notice fails to reach the original offeree, there is no receipt and no contract. By
contrast, the common law’s dispatch rule states an acceptance, with a few
exceptions, is effective at the time it is sent. Thus, the offeror’s ability to revoke
its offer comes to an end. Under the BGB, if a revocation of the counteroffer
reaches the original offeror before or at the same time that the original offeror’s
acceptance reaches the original offeree, no contract is formed.106 Under
counteroffer theory, the risks of loss or delay of the acceptance to the
counteroffer are borne by the original offeror. Therefore, if a revocation of the
counteroffer were received by the original offeror during the period in which the
acceptance is delayed, the receipt of the delayed acceptance would be of no
consequence. According to the common law, there would be a contract since the
acceptance of the counteroffer was effective upon dispatch. The fact that the
revocation was received prior to the acceptance is of no consequence.
Article 21(1) of the CISG contains an exception to the CISG’s general
receipt rule. A declaratory notice becomes effective as long as it has been
“dispatched.”107 Therefore, the risk of loss or delay of the declaratory notice is
borne by the original offeree.108 This rule is in line with the common law’s
dispatch theory in which the effectiveness of an acceptance is triggered by its
dispatch. According to CISG Article 27, such dispatch shall be made by means
appropriate under the circumstances.109 Under American common law, there is
103. See SCHLECHTRIEM & SCHWENZER: COMMENTARY ON THE UN CONVENTION ON THE
INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS (CISG) 254 (Ingeborg Schwenzer ed., Oxford Univ. Press 2d ed.
2005) [hereinafter SCHLECHTRIEM & SCHWENZER].
104. Id. at 253. See also FRITZ ENDERLEIN & DIETRICH MASKOW, INTERNATIONAL SALES
LAW 104 (1992).
105. CISG, supra note 4, art. 15(1), 18(2).
106. BGB art. 130(1) (Ger.) (effectiveness of a declaration of intent to absent parties). See also
CISG, supra note 4, art. 18 (2) (an acceptance of an offer becomes effective at the moment the
indication of assent reaches the offeror).
107. SCHLECHTRIEM & SCHWENZER, supra note 103, at 307, 314.
108. See id. at 253.
109. Id. at 307 (“However, in so far as the ideas underlying Article 27 are also relevant to
communications provided for in Part II and the need for them to be dispatched or to ‘reach’ the
addressee has been left open, it will be possible, on the basis of Article 7 (2), to apply the principle
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not much difference between counteroffer theory and effective acceptance
theory in this area since the common law generally treats acceptance as effective
when it is sent, not when it arrives.110
Under the effective acceptance theory, the offeree is prevented from
revoking because the contract is formed when the late acceptance is received,
pending the sending of a notice by the offeror informing the offeree of the
effectiveness of the late acceptance (delay in transmission scenario). In effective
acceptance theory, after late acceptance has been received, the offeree does not
have a right to revoke if the offeror dispatches the required declaratory notice.
This is similar to the common law’s rule relating to an acceptance overtaking a
rejection. If an acceptance is sent but is overtaken by a subsequently sent
rejection, a contract is formed upon the dispatch of the acceptance, removing the
right of rejection.111
The common law makes a number of exceptions to the dispatch rule for
effective acceptance. First, if the offeree uses an improper form of transmitting
the acceptance, improperly addresses the communication, or does not take
“reasonable precautions to ensure safe transmission,”112 the acceptance becomes
effective on receipt.113 Second, in cases where a rejection is sent but not yet
received before the offeree changes his or her mind and sends an acceptance, the
dispatch rule would work an injustice on an offeror who first receives and relies
upon the rejection. In such cases, the common law subjects the acceptance to a
receipt rule.114 Therefore, whichever communication, rejection or acceptance,
reaches the offeror first becomes effective.
To repeat, if the acceptance is sent first, followed by a rejection, a contract
is formed under the dispatch rule, but if the rejection is sent first and is
overtaken by an acceptance, a contract is formed if the acceptance is received
before the rejection. The rationale for the second rule is that it would be unjust
not to allow the offeror to rely on the rejection if it is the first-received
instrument. This seems nonsensical since one would have the same injustice if
the rejection were received prior to the acceptance in the event the rejection
underlying Article 27.”).
110. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 63 (1981):
Unless the offer provides otherwise,
(1) an acceptance made in a manner and by a medium invited by an offer is
operative and completes the manifestation of mutual assent as soon as put
out of the offeree’s possession, without regard to whether it ever reaches
the offeror; but
(2) an acceptance under an option contract is not operative until received by
the offeror.
111. See id.; FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS, supra note 46, at 337-38.
112. JOSEPH M. PERILLO & JOHN D. CALAMARI, CALAMARI AND PERILLO ON CONTRACTS 112
(West Grp. 5th ed. 2003).
113. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 66-67 (1981); FARNSWORTH ON
CONTRACTS, supra note 46, at 339.
114. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 63 cmt. c, illus. 7 (1981); FARNSWORTH ON
CONTRACTS, supra note 46, at 340-41.
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overtakes the acceptance. The rationale for not protecting the offeror in the first
instance is the offeror is more likely to suffer harm if the offeree is able to
opportunistically play the market. For example, the offeree sends an acceptance
by regular mail, deemed to be a proper means of transmission, which takes two
to three days to deliver. While the acceptance is in transmission, the offeree
monitors the market and determines he can now obtain a contract at a better
price. He then sends an e-mail rejection that is received prior to the acceptance
in order to take advantage of the market change. This would be unfair to the
offeror and, therefore, the dispatch rule remains in place.115 This is a weak
argument since the same rationale can be applied to the “exception rule”
(acceptance overtaking a rejection), wherein the offeree sends a rejection by
regular mail, monitors the market, and then expeditiously sends an acceptance.
The rational approach would be to apply to both situations (rejection overtaken
by acceptance and acceptance overtaken by rejection) the rule that whichever
instrument is received first should control.
Third, under counteroffer theory, unless the late acceptance (counteroffer)
specifies the period allowed for the original offeror’s reply, the original offeror
must accept the counteroffer by dispatch within a reasonable time.116 However,
under the effective acceptance approach, the offeror shall notify “without delay”
of the effectiveness of the acceptance.117 The question is whether there is a
difference between acceptance of a counteroffer within a reasonable time and
notification of the effectiveness of a late acceptance without delay. Lando and
Beale indicate the time set for acceptance of a counteroffer within a reasonable
time is generally longer, under most circumstances, than the time provided for
effective notice without delay in effective acceptance theory.118 Therefore, the
offeror is provided additional time under counteroffer theory to speculate on
market movements before accepting. However, the additional period of time
provided for acceptance of a counteroffer can be terminated at any time by the
original offeree’s revocation of the counteroffer.119
115. Id. at 113.
116. See Contract Law of the People’s Republic of China (adopted and promulgated by the 2d
Sess. of the 9th Nat’l People’s Cong. Mar. 15, 1999, effective Oct. 1, 1999) [hereinafter CCL], art.
23 (“An acceptance shall reach the offeror within the time limit fixed by the offer. If no time limit is
fixed by the offer, the acceptance shall reach the offeror in accordance with the following
provisions: (1) if an offer is made orally, acceptance shall be made promptly unless the parties
stipulate otherwise; and (2) if an offer is not made orally, the acceptance shall reach the offeror
within a reasonable period of time.”); BGB art. 146 (Ger.) (“An offer expires if a refusal is made to
the offeror, or if no acceptance is made to this person in good time in accordance with sections 147
to 149.”); CISG, supra note 4, art. 18 (2) (“An acceptance is not effective if the indication of assent
does not reach the offeror within the time he has fixed or, if no time is fixed, within a reasonable
time, due account being taken of the circumstances of the transaction, including the rapidity of the
means of communication employed by the offeror.”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 41
(1981) (“An offeree’s power of acceptance is terminated at the time specified in the offer, or, if no
time is specified, at the end of a reasonable time.”).
117. SCHLECHTRIEM & SCHWENZER, supra note 103, at 254.
118. See PECL, supra note 22, art. 2:207.
119. CCL, supra note 116, art. 18; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 42 (1981).
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In some situations, the time of acceptance is so truncated there is little
opportunity for a late acceptance. The CISG proffers “an oral offer must be
accepted immediately unless the circumstances indicate otherwise.”120 In reality,
this is no different than the general rule that an offeree must accept within a
reasonable period of time. Reasonable time is determined by a contextual
inquiry. The need to accept an oral offer immediately can be justified under the
broader rule that an offer must be accepted within a reasonable period of time,
such as prior to the termination of the telephone conversation in which the offer
was made. For example, because stock and bond markets are volatile by nature,
contracts are formed within seconds. A stockbroker telephones a client and
states he can purchase a certain stock at a given price. The client replies by
stating he needs a few minutes to look at his financials and hangs up the phone.
A few moments later the client calls the stockbroker, accepts, and orders the
stockbroker to purchase the stock. The problem is the offer reasonably lapsed at
the time the offeree ended the first telephone conversation. By the time the client
called back, the market price would have likely changed, and it would therefore
have been unfair to preclude the stockbroker from selling the stock to another
client after the termination of the first call.
Fourthly, differences arise concerning whether the original offeror’s reply
(notice) can be withdrawn. In counteroffer theory, the original offeror’s reply is
deemed an acceptance; however, such acceptance may be withdrawn if the
withdrawal reaches the original offeree before or at the same time as the notice
of acceptance.121 In effective acceptance theory, as discussed above, the original
offeror’s notice of effective acceptance is a declaratory notice, which becomes
effective once it has been dispatched. Therefore, it seems such notice cannot be
withdrawn. However, it can be argued that CISG Article 22 can be applied by
analogy to the offeror’s notice.122 The original offeror should be allowed to
withdraw his or her notice of late acceptance if the withdrawal reaches the
offeree prior to receipt of the notice. Schlechtriem and Schwenzer state: “the
effectiveness of a declaration which only needs to be dispatched does not
necessarily have anything to do with the declarer’s being bound by his
declaration.”123 They reason the notice-withdrawal scenario is analogous to the
offer-revocation situation where the offeror is allowed to revoke the offer prior
to the offeree’s receipt of the offer. In fact, the offer may be revoked after
receipt, unless the offer is determined to be an irrevocable offer.124 The issue

120. CISG, supra note 4, art. 18(2).
121. CCL, supra note 116, art. 27 (“An acceptance may be withdrawn. The withdrawal notice
of the acceptance shall reach the offeror before or at the same time as the acceptance notice reaches
the offeror.”); CISG, supra note 4, art. 22 (“An acceptance may be withdrawn if the withdrawal
reaches the offeror before or at the same time, as the acceptance would have become effective.”).
122. See SCHLECHTRIEM & SCHWENZER, supra note 103, at 253, 314.
123. Id. at 314.
124. Article 16(2) creates a broad firm offer rule based upon the offeror fixing an amount of
time upon which the offer will remain open, under Article 16(2)(a) or even if there is not such
statement or assurance if it is “reasonable for the offeree to rely on the offer as being irrevocable.”

http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/bjil/vol34/iss1/5
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.15779/Z38756T

70

BERKELEY JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 34:1

then becomes whether the notice of late acceptance is more like an offer or an
acceptance. The principle of good faith in CISG Article 7(1) supports the idea
that a rule that protects the addressee of such declarations is preferred.125
However, Schlechtriem and Schwenzer make a strong case that “where the
addressee is not aware of a declaration on the ground that it has not yet reached
him, it should be possible to withdraw it, since he has not yet acquired any
position worthy of protection.”126
The common law’s dispatch rule for effective acceptance results in a
different answer. The authoritative opinion is the original offeror’s acceptance
of a counteroffer binds the contract at the time of dispatch. Comment c to
Restatement section 63 states that even if “the offeree has power to reclaim his
acceptance from the post office or telegraph company [such an act] does not
prevent the acceptance from taking effect on dispatch.”127 Therefore, it can also
be argued that the offeror’s notice under the effective acceptance theory is akin
to an acceptance, which binds the contract upon dispatch and makes it
impossible for the offeror to withdraw the notice of effective acceptance.
Lastly, the time of the conclusion of a contract varies between the two
theories. In counteroffer theory, according to the principle of “reach” under the
BGB, the contract is formed when the original offeror’s “acceptance” of the late
acceptance reaches the original offeree.128 According to effective acceptance
theory, the dispatching of the offeror’s declaratory notice binds the contract
retroactively to the time when the late acceptance was received.129 In contrast to
the CISG and BGB, American common law treats the declaratory notice as
binding the contract at the time of its dispatch.130 Therefore, depending on the
applicable law a contract may be concluded at the time of the receipt of the late
acceptance, at the time that the offeror dispatches a declaratory notice, or at the
time that the declaratory notice reaches the offeree.

CISG, supra note 4, art. 16(2), 16(2)(b).
125. Id. art. 7(1).
126. SCHLECHTRIEM & SCHWENZER, supra note 103, at 315.
127. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 63 cmt. c (1981).
128. BGB art. 130 (Ger.). See also CCL, supra note 116, art. 26 (“The acceptance becomes
effective when the acceptance notice reaches the offeror.”); CISG, supra note 4, art. 18 (2) (“An
acceptance of an offer becomes effective at the moment the indications of assent reaches the
offeror.”); CISG, supra note 4, art. 23 (“A contract is concluded at the moment when an acceptance
of an offer becomes effective in accordance with the provision of this Convention.”).
129. See SCHLECHTRIEM & SCHWENZER, supra note 103, at 254 (“The contract is formed not
when the offeror gives written notice of approval to the offeree or orally informs him thereof,
but retroactively at the time when the late declaration of acceptance reached the offeror. . .”); see
also Commentary on the Draft Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods
prepared by the Secretariat, at 25, art. 19 cmt. 3, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 97/5 (March 14, 1979) (“It is
the late acceptance which becomes the effective acceptance as of the moment of its receipt, even
though it requires the subsequent notice to validate it.”); HUBER & MULLIS, supra note 47, at 99.
130. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 63 (1981).
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Chinese Contract Law (CCL)

Generally, the gaps in the CCL need to be filled by the courts through
analogical reasoning. This could be accomplished either through the use of other
rules in the CCL (internal analogical reasoning), by using other similarly
situated case decisions (common law), or, as is common in commercial law,
recognizing an existing trade usage to fill in the gap (rule creation). The lack of
a comprehensive set of late acceptance rules in the CCL is especially troubling,
since the drafters of the CCL should have anticipated such a scenario in an offeracceptance model of contract formation. A review of other national laws and
international legal instruments show the BGB, CISG, and the PICC have
adopted a complete set of late acceptance rules. This unnecessary gap in the
CCL can be easily fixed through amendments.
a.

CCL on Late Acceptance

Under CCL Article 26, acceptance becomes effective when the notice
reaches the offeror. If the offer does not require a return notice or promise of
acceptance, then it becomes effective when an act of acceptance is performed in
light of trade practices or as indicated by the offer. The flaw in the CCL is it
recognizes or can be interpreted as recognizing either the counteroffer or
effective acceptance approaches. CCL Article 28 provides “if the offeree
dispatches an acceptance beyond the time limit for acceptance, it shall
constitute a new offer unless the offeror notifies the offeree in time that the
acceptance is effective.”131 Despite the term “new offer,” the rule is a reflection
of effective receipt theory.
Despite the wording of Article 28, most Chinese scholars prefer the
counteroffer approach. One scholar argues:
The usefulness of the proviso [in Article 28] is questionable, since the late
acceptance may be deemed as a new offer. The offeror’s notice of considering the
late acceptance as effective, [if the law is to be re-drafted], shall be converted into
‘acceptance’ and the ‘without delay’ shall be replaced by ‘in a reasonable
time.’132

According to the above approach, Article 28 of the CCL should be
interpreted to mean a late acceptance is always a counteroffer and can never be
transformed into an effective acceptance by the original offeror.133 This includes
the situation where the acceptance is properly dispatched by the offeree but is
delayed in transmission at no fault of the offeree. Unfortunately, Article 28 does
not distinguish a late acceptance due to a delay in transmission from one sent
belatedly; therefore, all late acceptances are treated the same.

131. CCL, supra note 116, art. 28.
132. HAN SHIYUAN, CONTRACT LAW 100 (Law Press China 3d ed. 2011).
133. See A PROPOSITIONAL VERSION WITH REASONS FOR CIVIL CODE DRAFT OF CHINA 63,
art. 886(1) (Liang Huixing ed., 2013) [hereinafter Liang, PROPOSITIONAL CCC].
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Despite the wording of Article 28 and the scholarly commentary regarding
it, this Article states that the effective acceptance theory is the preferable
approach.134 First, compared with the counteroffer theory, effective acceptance
theory protects the offeree’s reasonable expectations that a contract has been
formed, especially in cases of a delay in transmission. In cases where the offeree
knowingly sends a belated offer, then, depending on the situation, such
expectations would be unreasonable. A pitfall of the counteroffer approach is it
allows the offeror additional time to act opportunistically, since counteroffer
theory affords the offeror a “reasonable time” (under CCL Article 23) to
respond, while the late acceptance theory requires notice “without delay.”
Therefore, the offeror has more time to monitor market price fluctuations before
committing to the contract. At the other end, especially in the case of delayed
transmission, the offeree is under the impression she has contracted at a fixed
price and is unable to enter the market to stem her losses if her counteroffer is
eventually rejected.135 The more time the law allows the offeror to decide, the
greater the risk of speculation and uncertainty relative to the offeree. The
effective acceptance theory provides greater certainty and is a more efficient
rule that deters opportunistic behavior.136
As a matter of efficiency, since contract formation has already been
delayed due to the late arrival of the acceptance, contract law should provide an
efficient rule that requires a faster, more certain way to contract formation. In
the late acceptance situation, whether by belated dispatch or delayed
transmission, the offeror is given the option to conclude or not conclude the
contract. This is as it should be, but this option should not be subject to abuse.
That is why effective acceptance theory requires a prompt response to the
receipt of the late acceptance. Unlike an acceptance containing conflicting or
additional terms (counteroffer), where the offeror may need time to consider the
new or different terms, the late acceptance rules only apply if the late acceptance
is an unequivocal acceptance of the offer (a valid acceptance but for its
lateness). In the end, the offeror should be incentivized to make a prompt
decision to contract or not to contract.
Second, under the effective acceptance approach, the conclusion of a
contract is determined retroactively to the time of the arrival of the late
acceptance.137 This provides security in the formation of the contract in that it
fixes a certain time, as opposed to having to determine when the declaratory
notice is sent or received. It also freezes the ability of the offeree to change her

134. Of course, the offeree may characterize its reply to offer as a counter offer either
explicitly or by referring to the offer as already lapsed. If this is the case, the effective acceptance
theory cannot be applied. See COMMON EUROPEAN SALES LAW (CESL): COMMENTARY 200 (Reiner
Schulze ed., 2012) [hereinafter CESL].
135. C.M. BIANCA & M.J. BONELL ET AL., COMMENTARY ON THE INTERNATIONAL SALES
LAW:
THE
1980
VIENNA
SALES
CONVENTION
193
(Guiffrè
ed.,
1987),
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/farnsworth-bb21.html [hereinafter BIANCA & BONELL].
136. See SHI JINGXIA, SALES CONTRACT 58-59 (1999).
137. See KÖTZ & FLESSNER, supra note 54, at 33.
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mind by revoking her late acceptance prior to receiving the confirmatory notice
from the offeror that a contract has been reached. In this regard, the effective
acceptance approach benefits the offeror.
Third, since China adopted the CISG in 1988,138 any divergence between
its rules and those in the CCL is inherently inefficient. The offer-acceptance
rules in the CISG should have been uniformly transferred to the CCL.
Unfortunately, the CISG acceptance rules transplanted to the CCL were not an
exact copy, resulting in uncertainty as to their meaning in the CCL. Reforming
the CCL to be consistent with the CISG would rectify this unfortunate
divergence.
Lastly, the trend in the modernization of national sales laws and in
international legal instruments such as the CISG has been toward adopting the
effective acceptance approach.139 In the context of global efficiency, greater
similarity among legal regimes will lead to more certainty, which will in turn
tend to reduce impediments to international trade. However, the late acceptance
rule as stated in the CISG is not without flaws. The primary flaw in Article 21 is
the use of the word “dispatches,” which leads to a plausible interpretation that
late acceptance becomes effective at the time of the dispatch of notice by the
offeror, even if it is not subsequently received by the offeree. The better
interpretation is that the general theory of receipt (adopted by the CISG) places
the risk of transmission on the most efficient insurer of its receipt—the sending
party (offeror). The purpose of Article 21 should be read as requiring a dispatch
of notice “without delay,” but not as preempting the general theory of receipt
adopted by the CISG. Therefore, the notice becomes effective at the time of the
offeree’s receipt of the notice. A complete scheme of late acceptance rules
would require the notice be dispatched “without delay” and the notice received
within a reasonable time from dispatch. This is possible under the CISG, as
noted above, with dispatch without delay being an express rule and the necessity
of its receipt (within a reasonable time) being an implied general principle of the
CISG.140
Further support for the adoption or interpretation of the CCL as an effective
acceptance regime, as well as a receipt rule for the purpose of sending notices to

138. See Pace Law School’s list of the members of CISG. CISG Database, supra note 6,
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/countries/cntries-China.html.
139. See, e.g., CODICE CIVIL (C.C.) art. 1326(3) (It.); Art. 6:223(1) BW (Neth.); PICC, supra
note 21, art. 2.1.9(1); PECL, supra note 22, art. 2:207(1); See PRINCIPLES, DEFINITIONS AND MODEL
RULES OF EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW - DRAFT COMMON FRAME OF REFERENCE (C. Von Bar et al ed.,
2009), https://www.law.kuleuven.be/web/mstorme/2009_02_DCFR_OutlineEdition.pdf [hereinafter
DCFR], art. II (4:207)(1).
140. The implied general rule that a communication is only effective upon receipt is derived
from the CISG’s offer and acceptance approach: an offer is good when it “reaches the offeree.”
CISG, supra note 4, art. 15(1). A withdrawal of an offer is valid “if the revocation reaches the
offeree before he has dispatched an acceptance.” Id. art. 16(1). An acceptance is effective “at the
moment the indication of assent reaches the offeror.” Id. art. 18(2). Thus, when the word “notice” is
used, it is simply a substantive rule that notice must be given, but its effectiveness should be
determined by the receipt rule.
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determine the effectiveness of the late acceptance, is found in the PICC. The
PICC follows the effective acceptance theory of the CISG, but uses the word
“reach” instead of “dispatch” when referring to the sending of notice by the
offeror. PICC provides “[a] late acceptance is nevertheless effective as an
acceptance if without undue delay the offeror so informs the offeree or gives
notice to that effect.”141 As to when such notice becomes effective, it states: “A
notice is effective when it reaches the person to whom it is given.”142 The PECL
also requires the offeror to inform the offeree of the status or effectiveness of the
late acceptance.143 A comment to the PECL’s late acceptance rules makes clear
the notice must reach the offeree.144 Another comment expressly rejects the
counteroffer theory:
Some legal systems treat a late acceptance as a new offer, which the offeror
may accept within the time set for acceptance [within a reasonable period of
time], which is often longer than the time provided in [Article 2:207(1): ‘without
delay’]. The [PECL does] not contain such a rule.145
Therefore, whether the lateness of the acceptance is due to a belated
sending or a delay in transmission, the late acceptance can still be an effective
acceptance.146 The need for the offeree to receive the offeror’s notice is the
mainstream view supported by the receipt theory.
In sum, the CCL late acceptance rules are comprised of a variety of
elements, some of which are not a good fit with others in the context of the
national and international laws reviewed in this Article. First, CCL Articles 28
and 29 provide the standard bifurcated approach to late acceptance—for
acceptances belatedly sent (Article 28) and cases of delayed transmission
(Article 29). Article 28 adopts both the counteroffer and late acceptance
approaches. Thus, a belatedly sent acceptance is a counteroffer that the original
offeror has a reasonable time to accept unless the offeror “promptly” responds to
accept the late acceptance (effective acceptance approach). Article 29 asserts in
the delayed transmission scenario, the late acceptance is effective to conclude a
contract unless the offeror promptly notifies the offeree otherwise.

141. PICC, supra note 21, art. 2.9(1).
142. Id. art. 1.9(2).
143. PECL, supra note 22, art. 2:207 (Late Acceptance).
144. Id. cmt. B (Assent to a Late Acceptance); id. illus. 1 (offeror’s notice “comes to
[offeree’s] notice”).
145. Id. cmt. D.
146. Notes to the PECL, supra note 22, indicate which laws are in accordance with Article
2:207 and which ones are not. Regarding Article 2:207(1) (belated sending of acceptance), it lists the
CISG (art. 21(1)), PICC (art. 2.9(1)), BURGERLIJK WETBEOK (BW) Article 6:223(1) (Neth.),
Portuguese CC (art. 229), and Codice Civil (C.c.) Article 1326(3) (It.). Those laws that treat the late
acceptance (belatedly sent) as a counteroffer include BGB Section 150 and ASTIKOS KODIKAS
[A.K.] [CIVIL CODE] 19(1) (Greece). In the case of late acceptance due to a delay in transmission,
the PECL is in accord with the CISG (art. 21(2)) and PICC (art. 2.9(2), as well as BGB Section 149,
ASTIKOS KODIKAS [A.K.] [CIVIL CODE] 190 (Greece), and BURGERLIJK WETBEOK (BW) art.
6:223(1) (Neth.).
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Unfortunately, Article 29 fails to include the common wording that the delay in
transmission must have been obvious or known to the offeror.147
Unlike CISG Article 21(1)’s unfortunate use of the word “dispatch[es],”
language in the CCL makes clearer notice provided by the offeror is good upon
receipt—not upon dispatch. CCL Articles 28 and 29 require the offeror to
promptly inform the offeree of the validity of said acceptance. The word
“inform” indicates the offeree must actually receive the notice. This
interpretation is consistent with the receipt rule, which is standardized
throughout the CCL.148 Use of the effective receipt theory for both types of late
acceptance would simplify these concepts by establishing a single rule—the
offeror may activate the effectiveness of late acceptance if he informs the
offeree to that effect “promptly” (without delay). Under this rule, notice
becomes effective when it reaches the offeree, while the contract is concluded
retroactively to the date when the late acceptance reaches the offeror.
Furthermore, the offeror is free to withdraw his notice before or at the same time
as when the notice reaches the offeree. Alternatively, if the counteroffer
approach is retained in Article 28, the sub-optimal choice in such cases is that
the offeror is allowed to accept the counteroffer (late acceptance) “in a
reasonable time” instead of“without delay” so that he can speculate at the
offeree’s expense.
b.

Acceptance by Performance

The CCL recognizes unilateral contract formation in which a contract can
be formed by the offeree “performing an act” in light of prior dealings between
the parties, trade practices, or as otherwise indicated in the offer.149 Questions
remain as to how one should define an “act,” and whether the offeree needs to
provide notice it has performed the required act. CCL Article 26 addresses these
questions by stating: “If an acceptance needn’t be notified, it becomes effective
when an act of acceptance is performed in accordance with transaction practices

147. See Ye Jinqiang, System Arrangement of Delay in Transmission in Chinese Contract Law,
1 L. SCI. 88, 89-90 (2012). But see HUBER & MULLIS, supra note 47, at 98-99.
148. See CCL, supra note 116, art. 16 (An offer becomes effective when it reaches the
offeree); id. art. 17 (An offer may be withdrawn, if the withdrawal notice reaches the offeree before
or at the same time that the offer reaches the offeree); id. art. 18 (An offer can be cancelled if the
revocation reaches the offeree before the offeree sends its acceptance); id. art. 20(1) (An offer can be
extinguished if notice of rejection reaches the offeror); id. art. 23 (An acceptance shall reach the
offeror within the period set within the offer); id. art. 24 (The time limit for acceptance commences
from the moment that the offer reaches the offeree); id. art. 26 (The acceptance becomes effective
when its notice reaches the offeror); id. art. Article 27 (Notice of withdrawal shall reach the offeror
before the notice of acceptance). The articles dealing with late acceptance do not use the words
“dispatch” or “receipt.” CCL Article 28 (belated sending of acceptance) states: “[O]fferor informs
the offeree of the effectiveness of the said acceptance promptly.” CCL Article 29 (delay in
transmission) states: “[O]fferor informs the offeree promptly that it does not accept the acceptance.”
Given the use of the receipt rule throughout the CCL formation rules, the only reasonable
interpretation of Articles 28 and 29 is that the notice of effectiveness or non-effectiveness of the late
acceptance must be received by the offeree.
149. See id. art. 22.
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or as required in the offer.”150 Thus, if the offer does not require notice and
invites acceptance by performance, no notice is required. In determining what
constitutes an “act” of acceptance, the court is to consider whether the offer
provides a “definition” of the act needed to bind the contract. For example, the
offer may state: “ship the goods immediately.” If the offer is silent as to what
constitutes an act, the court is to look at “transaction practices.”151 However, it is
unclear what “transaction practices” actually entails. For example, do
“transaction practices” entail prior dealings between the parties, trade usage,
business custom, or some combination of these factors? The accepted
interpretation of “transaction practices” includes practices developed between
the parties (prior dealings).152 Chinese commentary has asserted the act of
acceptance may be based upon an “established long term relationship,”153 as in
the case of when silence may be a means of acceptance.154
The key issue is whether the contract becomes binding at the beginning of
the offeree’s performance or when the performance is completed. CCL Article
26 states acceptance occurs “when an act of acceptance is performed.” A strict
interpretation of this provision would find that complete performance is
required. However, this would be an inefficient interpretation, since it allows the
offeror to revoke his or her offer prior to the offeree’s completion of
performance, thereby producing wasted expenditures. Since Article 26 does not
define “act of performance,” a more liberal and reasonable interpretation would
be the contract is binding at the beginning of performance, unless the offer states
otherwise. Professor Han argues for such an approach as a way of protecting the
reasonable expectations of the offeree such that as long as he commences
performance within a reasonable time, he is assured that a contract has been
formed and is no longer subject to revocation.155
Another issue is whether the offeree is required to notify the offeror of
performance. Notice would not be required if the offeree did not provide notice
in prior dealings with the offeror. As noted above, Article 26 uses the term
150. See id. art. 26.
151. Id.
152. See WANG LIMING, STUDY ON CONTRACT LAW 238 (2002) [hereinafter LIMING, STUDY
OF CONTRACT LAW].
153. SHIYUAN, CONTRACT LAW, supra note 132, at 108-09.
154. The CCL does not contain a rule that provides for an exception whereby the offeree’s
silence by the offeree can function as an acceptance. CCL Article 21 states “[a]n acceptance is a
statement made by the offeree indicating assent to an offer.” However, given that Article 26 does not
require notice for acceptance by performance “in accordance with transaction practices,” those same
“transaction practices” should allow for acceptance by silence. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONTRACTS (1981) §69 (Acceptance by Silence); CISG Article 18(1) states: “Silence or
inactivity does not in itself amount to acceptance.” The phrase “in itself” is interpreted to mean that
usage, such as prior dealings, can make silence a means of acceptance. CISG COMMENTARY 268 (S.
Kröll, L. Mistelis & P. Perales Viscasillas ed. 2011): “Circumstances which may indicate intent to
accept [by silence] the offer include the agreement of the parties to that effect, the practices
established between the parties, as well as usages that are binding upon the parties on the grounds of
Art. 9 [international trade usage].”
155. SHIYUAN, supra note 132, at 108.
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“transaction practices.” This term, however, is confusing due to the lack of a
counterpart phrase in Western contract law. Usage may refer not only to
practices developed between repeat players (prior dealings), but also to industry
or business usage, customs, and practices. It seems Article 26 is referring to the
former type of usage. Nonetheless, usage of the latter type, in which giving
notice is not customary or expected, implies failure to give notice would not
prevent a contract from becoming binding. Although not stated in the CCL, this
interpretation is found in Chinese commentary.156 A further question is then
presented: if the offeree sends a required notice in a unilateral contract situation
when is the contract formed? Commentary suggests the contract is formed not
by performance but upon receipt by the offeror of notice of the commencement
of the act.157
c.

CCL Late Acceptance in Practice

Although Chinese case law offers sparse applications of CCL Articles 28
and 29, existing scholarship discusses the meaning and flaws of those articles.
First, the bifurcation of late acceptance between the two CCL Articles is less
than ideal. Taken alone, Article 28 indicates all late acceptances are
counteroffers that the original offeror is free to disregard. But Article 29
indicates that if the late acceptance is due to a delayed transmission, it
constitutes an effective acceptance (unless the offeror notifies the offeree
otherwise). However, if the offeror expressly fixes a date upon which the
acceptance must be received, a late acceptance due to a delayed transmission
would be ineffective.158
Other Chinese commentary suggests the late delivery of an acceptance sent
within the time allowed for acceptance is a “standard” type of late acceptance.
Professor Wang Cheng emphasizes that the CCL fails to regulate the scenario in
which an acceptance is sent within the period set for receipt of the acceptance
(within a reasonable period of time) but is not received within the period implied
in law (a reasonable period of time from the receipt of the offer).159 Therefore,
by analogy to Article 29, a timely dispatch followed by untimely delivery (not
due to a delay in transmission) is a late acceptance, which means it is treated as
a counteroffer. That is, it is to be treated just like an acceptance that is sent
late.160
In the scenario of a belated dispatch, CCL Article 28 allows the offeror to
convert the counteroffer into an effective acceptance by giving timely notice to
that effect. The offeror has the option to accept the “late acceptance immediately
156. See SHIYUAN, supra note 132, at 109; LIMING, STUDY ON CONTRACT LAW, supra note
152, at 238.
157. Id. at 121 (which of the two sources in the previous footnote does this refer to?).
158. See, e.g., BGB § 148 (Ger.) (“Fixing a Period for Acceptance”).
159. PRINCIPLES OF NEW CONTRACT LAW AND COMMENTS ON RELEVANT CASES 67 (Cui
Jianyuan ed., 1999).
160. Id. See also SHIYUAN, supra note 132, at 100.
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or, just decide within a reasonable time whether to accept the new offer [based
on market changes].”161 Other scholars have criticized this view as embracing
both the counteroffer and effective acceptance approaches to late acceptance,
thus conflating the two theories. Professor Li Yongjun states:
If [we] interpret it literally, it should be that if the offeror notifies the offeree that
he considers the late acceptance to be effective, then such late acceptance shall no
longer constitute a counteroffer. But in the strict sense, such interpretation
contradicts the rules of conclusion of a contract.162

As noted earlier, Professor Han offers an explanation for Article 28’s
“internal contradiction”—a late acceptance is a counteroffer but can also be an
effective acceptance at the option of the offeror.163
Based on the above critique, the Draft Civil Code of the People’s Republic
of China (Draft Chinese Civil Code or Draft CCC), edited by Liang Huixing,
suggests amending CCL Article 28 to state: “late acceptance of an offer is
[always] considered to be a new offer”164 and cannot be converted to an
effective acceptance by the offeror. We argue in the next sub-section that such
an approach is not optimal.
Very few Chinese scholars have commented on the meaning of the late
acceptance provisions found in CCL Article 29.165 However, further analysis
shows differences between Article 29 and BGB Article 149, as well as, CISG
Article 21(2). Both the BGB and CISG emphasize that if the offeror does not
want to be bound by a late acceptance due to late dispatch, he need not respond.
However, under the BGB and CISG, if the offeror knew or “ought” to have
known the late acceptance was caused by a delay in transmission, he is required

161. But even the author himself has to admit that in practice, in order to avoid the
opportunistic behavior of the offeror, even when the late acceptance has been considered a new offer
by the offeror, the offeror still has to accept it on time, instead of within a reasonable time. LIMING,
STUDY OF CONTRACT LAW, supra note 152, at 242; see also THE DRAFT CIVIL CODE OF THE
PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA: ENGLISH TRANSLATION art. 1297 (Liang Huixing ed., 2010)
[hereinafter DRAFT CCC] (“If the offeree makes an acceptance beyond the time limit for acceptance,
it shall constitute a new offer unless the offeror notifies the offeree in time that the acceptance is
effective.”); THE DRAFT CIVIL CODE OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA AND ITS LEGISLATION
REASONS: GENERAL PROVISIONS OF OBLIGATIONS & CONTRACTS 223 (Wang Liming ed., 2005)
[hereinafter Wang, LEGISLATION REASONS].
162. LI YONGJUN, CONTRACT LAW 121 (2004).
163. SHIYUAN, supra note 132.
164. Liang, PROPOSITIONAL CCC, supra note 133, art. 886(1), at 63-64.
165. See Wang, LEGISLATION REASONS, supra note 161, at 224 (following the provision of
CCL Articles 28 and 29 and stating that if an offeree makes within the time limit for acceptance an
acceptance that could reach the offeror in time under normal conditions but happens to reach the
offeror beyond the time limit due to other reasons, the acceptance shall nevertheless be effective
unless the offeror notifies the offeree in time and the acceptance is denied due to its delayed arrival);
see also Liang, PROPOSITIONAL CCC, supra note 133, at 63-64 (noting the difference between CCL
Article 29 and BGB Article 150 or CISG Article 21(2) and amending CCL Article 29 along these
lines: If the offeror could know if its transmission had been normal and the late acceptance would
have reached the offeror in due time, the offeror shall inform the offeree of the lateness of the
acceptance without undue delay; otherwise such late acceptance shall be deemed as not being late.).
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to notify the offeree that the offer has lapsed.166 If he fails to provide notice, the
late acceptance is effective and binds the contract. If the offeror did not or
should not have known of the delay in transmission, he can presume the late
acceptance was due to belated dispatch.167
On the other hand, CCL Article 29 does not provide such safeguards.
Under CCL Article 29, as noted previously, even if the offeror does not know
and could not know the offeree had dispatched the acceptance on time but had
simply experienced a delay in transmission, the offeror is still obliged to notify
the offeree if he does not want to be bound by the late acceptance. This places
an undue burden on the offeror who reasonably believes he had received a late
acceptance and is allowed to disregard it as a counteroffer.168 Professor Ye
Jinqiang argues in cases where the offeror had no indication the acceptance had
been delayed in transmission, the requirement of notifying the offeree of the
lateness of acceptance under CCL Article 29 is not appropriate both logically
and as a value judgment.169
d.

Reforming the CCL Late Acceptance Regime

Both the common core and “better rule” comparative law methodologies
support the effective acceptance approach, as opposed to the counteroffer
approach, to late acceptance. The CCL should be reformed, or the proposed
Draft Chinese Civil Code should be drafted,170 to fully embrace effective
acceptance theory. That said, it must be reiterated that late acceptance cannot be
adequately captured by a single rule; instead, it requires a batch of rules. This
Article has discussed multiple scenarios and the mix of potential rules that may
be used.
An effective reform of the CCL late acceptance rules would need to answer
the following questions: (1) how the law should deal with a belatedly sent

166. See HUBER & MULLIS, supra note 47, at 99; EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW, supra note 54,
at 34.
167. See HUBER & MULLIS, supra note 47, at 98-99.
168. It is possible that CCL Article 29 was transplanted partially from Article 159(1) of the
Civil Code of the Republic of China (Taiwan Civil Law). See DRAFT CCC, supra note 161, art.
159(1). Prior to the amendment to Article 159(1) of the Civil Code, CCL Article 29 was almost
identical in establishing that there is no such obligation on the offeror “if the offeror could have
known.” However, Article 159 of the Civil Code of the Republic of China was amended on April 2,
1999. The amendment indicated that the original writing of Article 159 made unclear as to whether
the offeror is only obligated to notify the offeree of the lateness of acceptance on the condition that
the offeror could have known that the lateness was caused by a delay in transmission when the late
acceptance was sent under circumstances such that it would have reached the offeror in due time had
its transmission been timely. In order to minimize ambiguity and protect the rights and interests of
the offeror, this amendment to Article 159(1) has provided the additional obligation of the offeror to
notify the offeree “if the offeror could have known.”
169. See Ye Jinqiang, supra note 147, at 90.
170. TOWARDS A CHINESE CIVIL CODE: COMPARATIVE AND HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES (Chen
Lei & C.H. von Rhee eds., 2012) (provides history behind the current project of the drafting and
enacting a Chinese Civil Code).
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acceptance; (2) how the law should deal with a late receipt of a timely
dispatched acceptance that has been delayed in transmission; (3) how the law
should deal with the issue of late acceptance in a unilateral contract (acceptance
by performance); (4) at what time a contract should be binding in different late
acceptance scenarios; (5) what the notice obligation of the offeror in accepting
or not accepting a late acceptance should be; (6) what the notice obligation of
the offeree in a scenario of late acceptance by performance should be; (7) what
rights the offeror should have in revoking his notice of effective acceptance; and
(8) what rights the offeree should have to withdraw his late acceptance between
its receipt and the offeror’s dispatch of notice.
Based upon the review of late acceptance rules, the effective acceptance
theory is preferable for three main reasons.171 First, compared with counteroffer
theory, the effective acceptance theory better protects the offeree against offeror
speculation, which is heightened under the former approach due to the extended
time that the reasonable period of time standard provides. Since the offeror is
entitled to choose to form a contract or not, he can make his decision in light of
market changes.172 Under the effective acceptance theory, however, the offeror
is not entitled to a “reasonable time” to provide notice. He must give notice of
an effective acceptance “without delay.” As compared to a “reasonable” time,
“without delay” has been interpreted to mean a much shorter time period.173
Effective acceptance theory protects the reasonable expectations of the offeree
and deters opportunistic behavior of the offeror. Thus, it is the more efficient
rule.174
Second, under the effective acceptance approach, the contract is concluded
at the time of arrival of the late acceptance, which is when the parties would
naturally assume the contract to be binding.175
Third, since China adopted the CISG prior to enacting the CCL, the theory
of effective acceptance, presented in CISG Article 21(1), was already the law in
China. Professor Feng Datong correctly states:
[I]n order to favor the conclusion of [a] contract, [the] CISG has taken a flexible
method to provide that under certain conditions the late acceptance can be
deemed as an effective acceptance and the contract can be concluded
accordingly . . . If Seller is still interested in concluding a contract with Buyer, he
may notify Buyer, without undue delay, that he considers Buyer’s acceptance as
being effective. If so, the contract is concluded accordingly, and the date of
conclusion is the date when the late acceptance arrives to Seller.176
171. Of course, the offeree may characterize its reply to an offer as a counter offer either
explicitly or by referring to the offer as having already lapsed. If this is the case, the effective
acceptance theory cannot be applied. See CESL, supra note 134, at 200.
172. See BIANCA & BONELL, supra note 135, at 192-93.
173. PECL, supra note 22, art. 2:207 (“Some legal systems treat a late acceptance as a new
offer which the offeror may accept within the time set for acceptance which is often longer than the
time [without delay] provided in paragraph 1.”); see also PECL, supra note 22, at 177.
174. JINGXIA, supra note 136, at 58-59.
175. KÖTZ & FLESSNER, supra note 54, at 33.
176. FENG DATONG, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW 51 (1995); see also WU JIANBING ET AL.,

Published by Berkeley Law Scholarship Repository, 2016

2016]

WESTERN CONTRACT LAW

81

In the interest of consistency, the divergent rules in the CISG and the CCL
on late acceptance should be reconciled. Given the CCL adopted many rules
directly from the CISG,177 the most reasonable solution would be to amend the
CCL’s late acceptance rules to be consistent with those found in the CISG.
In summary, the proposed changes to the current rules would answer the
questions posed at the beginning of this Part as follows:
1.
2.

3.

4.

5.

6.
7.

The offeror may treat an untimely dispatched acceptance as an effective
acceptance by providing notice to the offeree without delay;
A timely dispatched acceptance that is delayed in transmission (by no
fault of the offeree) should be considered an effective acceptance
(unless the offeror duly notifies the offeree of the late delivery and that
he is treating the offer as having lapsed);
In the case of a late acceptance in a unilateral contract (acceptance by
performance), the offeree should be required to provide notice of a
delay in performance, and the offeror should be allowed to revoke his
offer without delay. In return, the offeror should give notice that the
offer has lapsed, or that he intends to accept the late performance as
binding the contract;
In both the late acceptance scenarios involving an acceptance by
promise (bilateral contract), the contract should be binding at the time
of the arrival of the late acceptance. In a unilateral contract, the fairest
rule would be to bind the contract at the time the offeree begins
performance under the presumption that the offeree will complete
performance within a reasonable time;
In the case where there is a belated dispatch of an acceptance, the
offeror has no duty to notify the offeree of the receipt of the late
acceptance. The offeror should have a duty to notify the offeree of his
intent to accept a late acceptance in cases where the lateness was due to
a delay in transmission that the offeror knew or should have been aware
of;
In the case in which the offeror sends a notice of effective acceptance,
he should be allowed to revoke that notice in the event that the
revocation reaches the offeree on or before the notice; and
The offeree should not be allowed to revoke the late acceptance
between its receipt and offeror’s dispatch of notice of effective
acceptance. In such a scenario, the contract is binding retroactively to
the time of receipt of the late acceptance. This should only be the case
until the offeror’s “without delay” period has expired. If the “without
delay” period has expired, the late acceptance is not effective.178 This
would also bar the original offeror from later treating the late
acceptance as a counteroffer that could still be accepted within a
“reasonable time.”

The above set of late acceptance rules best protects the expectations of both
parties. It also allows for the consummation of a contract if that is, in fact, what
the parties desire. The law should recognize a presumption that the offeree is

INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS LAW 120 (2007).
177. See Han Shiyuan, Contract Law of China and CISG, 2 J. JINAN U. 8 (2011).
178. Note, however, that in cases of belated acceptance, the offeree could conceivably insert a
provision limiting the time period during which the offeror must provide notice of accepting the late
acceptance.
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willing to conclude a contract with the original offeror at the time the offeree
sends his late acceptance. Late acceptance rules are a way of recognizing the
parties’ intent to form a contract despite the late acceptance. The ability of the
offeror to conclude the contract by sending notice to the offeree is equivalent to
the offeree’s intent in sending the late acceptance.
The question of when the contract comes into being is an important one.
There are three options: (1) at the time the offeror dispatches the notice of
effective acceptance; (2) at the time the offeree receives notice of offeror’s
acceptance; or (3) at the time the offeror receives acceptance (as long as the
offeror promptly dispatches notice to the offeree).
The first option has been dismissed previously as nonsensical under the
receipt theory.179 Specifically, it places the risk of delayed or lost transmission
on the wrong party. The most efficient insurer is the sending party, not the
receiving party. This is the rationale that pervades the civil law and the CISG’s
receipt rule, as opposed to the “mailbox rule” of the common law (acceptance
effective upon dispatch). The second option is inconsistent with the offeror’s
declaration (notice) of effective acceptance. If the acceptance is effective, then
under the offer-acceptance model, it binds the contract upon receipt by the
offeror.
The third choice is preferred because it protects the offeror from
withdrawal of the late acceptance. Treating the late acceptance as merely a
counteroffer may result in injustice to the offeror. If the late acceptance is
treated as a counteroffer, a subsequent revocation defeats the reasonable
expectations of the original offeror intending to send notice of effective
acceptance. CISG Article 16 states the right of the offeror to revoke ends upon
the dispatch of the acceptance even though the acceptance is not effective upon
receipt. By analogy, the offeree’s right to withdraw a late acceptance should be
prevented during the “without delay” period, allowing the offeror to convert the
late acceptance into an effective acceptance. Furthermore, upon the offeror’s
dispatch of its notice of late acceptance, the right of the offeree to revoke
(counteroffer theory) should be extinguished.
In the end, the particular rules adopted in relation to the offer-acceptance
paradigm are less important than the adoption of a set of rules that are
comprehensive and internally consistent. An established English treatise on
contract law states:
[T]he phrase ‘offer and acceptance’ . . . is not to be applied as a talisman,
revealing, by a species of esoteric art, the presence of a contract . . . The rules
which the judges have elaborated from the premise of offer and acceptance are
neither the rigid deductions of logic nor the inspiration of natural justice. They are
only presumptions, drawn from experience, to be applied in so far as they serve
the ultimate object of establishing the phenomena of agreement.180

179. See CISG, supra note 4, 18(2) (accepts civil law’s receipt rule over the common law’s
dispatch or mailbox rule).
180. M. P. FURMSTON, CHESHIRE, FIFOOT, AND FURMSTON’S LAW OF CONTRACT 35-36 (11th
ed. 1986).
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The rule changes proposed in this Article are only the first step in a
process. The consistency and comprehensiveness of transplanted rules is more a
creation of the interpretation of the rules than the text of the rules.181 This is
especially the case, we argue, when the sources of the rules are in one language
and are then translated into the language of the receiving country. It is for the
courts through interpretation, or the government through amendment, to remove
the gaps and inconsistencies invariably found in translated texts. Incidentally,
the problem reappears when the native language version of the country of
transplant (i.e., Chinese) is translated “back” into the source rules’ native
language.
The next section provides an example of such a problem through a
discussion of anticipatory breach and adequate assurance. In the former FECL, a
seemingly more demanding threshold of a “sure guarantee” was required to
defeat a declaration of anticipatory breach.182 Such a standard of assurance of
performance is well beyond that found in any other law.183 The English
translation of the CCL has rectified such a burdensome and unwieldy standard.
That said, different translations of the CCL have used a variety of phrases, such
as “appropriate assurance,” “adequate assurance,” and “guarantee.”184 However,
since the CCL fails to define “adequate,” the aforementioned phrases are
sufficient because they all expunge the word “sure.”
B. Anticipatory Breach
“Anticipatory breach,” referred to in the common law as “anticipatory
repudiation,”185 is a manifestation—express or implicit—by one party to the
other that the first cannot or will not perform at least some of its obligations
under the contract at the time set for performance.186 In such cases, under certain
181. Simone Glanert, Speaking Language to Law: The Case of Europe, 28 LEGAL STUD. 161,
165 (2008) (when text is “translated back into the national language, this language becomes the
object of an interpretation by the national judge in every specific case.”). This interpretative process
captures the text within the cultural and legal traditions of the transplanting country and leads to
different meanings from those given the text from the country or legal system from which it was
borrowed. The success of transplantation can be measured by whether the different meanings
coalesce into a consistent whole.
182. See Foreign Economic Contract Law of 1985 (adopted at the 10th Sess. of the Standing
Comm. of the 6th Nat’l People’s Cong. Mar. 21, 1985), English translation reprinted in 3 INT’L TAX
& BUS. LAW. 1, 46-49 (1985) [hereinafter FECL], art. 17.
183. See U.C.C. § 2-609 cmt. 4 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2014); PECL, supra
note 22, art. 8:105 cmt. d.
184. See, e.g., Jianming Shen, Contract Law of the People’s Republic of China, ST. JOHN’S
UNIv.
(Fall
2005),
http://doc.mbalib.com/view/2a6fa23d6a499f9d21c82189ce6378af.html;
translated in Contract Law of the People’s Republic of China, NAT’L PEOPLE’S CONG. OF CHINA,
http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/11/content_1383564.htm (last accessed Mar. 16,
2016) (official translation).
185. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 253 (1981) (“Effect of Repudiation as a
Breach and on Other Party’s Duties”); see also id. § 2-610 (“Anticipatory Repudiation”); id. § 2-611
(“Retraction of Anticipatory Repudiation”).
186. See FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS, supra note 46, at 558.
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circumstances, the party receiving information of a prospective breach can act in
in advance of the breach to repudiate the contract. This allows the non-breaching
party to terminate the contract in advance of the breach (i.e., non-delivery of
goods) and commence an action for damages.187 The concept of anticipatory
breach was first established in Hochster v. De la Tour188 and has since been
universally accepted by common law countries, civil law countries, and
international private law instruments, including the CISG and the PICC.189 The
rationale behind the doctrine is that the contracting party has the right to expect
not only that the other party will perform when the time comes, but also that it
will do nothing to substantially impair that expectation before the time comes
for performance.190
1.

Seriousness of Breach

For an anticipatory breach to have legal effect, the threatened breach must
be serious and based upon credible information. According to the Restatement
and the UCC,191 the prospective non-performance must be serious enough that
the injured party is able to treat it as a “total breach,” which is defined as a
substantial impairment of the contract.192 Under the CISG, if, before the
performance date, it becomes “clear that one of the parties will commit a
fundamental breach of contract,” the other party can declare the contract to be
void.193 The PICC states that it must be “clear that there will be a fundamental
non-performance.”194 Finally, the CESL more vaguely states, “the nonperformance would be such as to justify termination.”195
2. Express Repudiation and Reasonable Grounds for Implied
Repudiation
The breach may be anticipated by words or by conduct. Usually, a breach
consists of a statement of the repudiating party that it cannot or will not perform.
The statement must be sufficiently affirmative such that a reasonable person
187. See id. at 565-68.
188. Hochster v. De la Tour (1853) 118 Eng. Rep. 922 (Que.).
189. BGB § 323 (Ger.); CISG, supra note 4, art. 72(1); U.C.C. §§ 2-610, 2-611 (AM. LAW
INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2014); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 250-257 (1981);
PICC, supra note 21, art. 7(3)(3).
190. See FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS, supra note 46, at 551-54.
191. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 250-57 (1981); U.C.C. § 2-610 (AM. LAW
INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2014).
192. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 243 (1981) provides a measure for
determining total breach: “a breach of non-performance [or anticipated non-performance] gives rise
to a claim for total breach only if it so substantially impairs the value of the contract to the injured
party.” See also U.C.C. § 2-610 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2014) (“substantially impair
the value of the contract. . .”).
193. CISG, supra note 4, art. 72(1).
194. PICC, supra note 21, art. 7.3.3.
195. CESL, supra note 134, at 116.
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would understand it to mean the breach will actually occur.196 A party may
repudiate by conduct as well. In that case, an anticipatory breach entails a
party’s voluntary affirmative act that renders the party actually or apparently
unable to perform. Since the conduct must be an affirmative act, mere delay in
performance is not an anticipatory breach.197
Since the act must be voluntary, inability to perform due to incompetence
or financial difficulties is also not an anticipatory breach.198 However, if such
circumstances give the other party reason to believe the first party will commit a
breach, the other party is entitled to exercise a right to self-help by suspending
its own performance until the first party performs or provides adequate security
relating to the future performance.199 UCC Section 2-609(1) provides that
“[w]hen reasonable grounds for insecurity arise with respect to the performance
of either party the other [party] may in writing demand adequate assurance of
due performance and until he receives such assurance may if commercially
reasonable suspend any performance for which he has not already received the
agreed return.” Further, UCC Section 2-609(4) states, “[a]fter receipt of a
justified demand failure to provide within a reasonable time not exceeding thirty
days such assurance of due performance as is adequate under the circumstances
of the particular case is a repudiation of the contract.”
The repudiating party would be in breach if it does not have reasonable
grounds for suspending performance or for demanding adequate assurance.200 If
a party does not have reasonable grounds, the court should question whether the
party nefariously made the demand in the hope of triggering a breach. This
would violate the anticipating party’s duty to act in accordance with the
principle of good faith.201
3.

Anticipatory Breach under the CCL

China “transplanted” the concept of anticipatory breach from its 1985
Foreign Economic Contract Law (FECL),202 which states:
A party may temporarily suspend its performance of the contract if it has
conclusive evidence that the other party is unable to perform the contract.

196. See FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS, supra note 46, at 559.
197. See Pappas v. Crist, 25 S.E.2d 850 (N.C. 1943) (where owner leased premises to another
lessee, this was an “unequivocal and absolute renunciation of the entire agreement to make the lease
to the plaintiff”); FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS, supra note 46, at 563-64.
198. FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS, supra note 46, at 564.
199. Id. at 572-73.
200. See U.C.C. § 2-509 cmt. 2 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2014).
201. See U.C.C. § 1-304 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2014); CCL, supra note 116,
art. 6.
202. The FECL was promulgated on March 21, 1985, became effective as of July 1, 1985, and
was simultaneously annulled when the CCL was promulgated in 1999. See generally WANG LIMING,
LIABILITIES FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT 146-47 (1996); Nan Zhengxing & Guo Dengke,
Comparative Study on Anticipatory Breach, 84 CHINESE J. L. 71-76 (1993). But see Han Shiyuan &
Cui Jianyuan, Anticipatory Breach and Chinese Contract Law, 86 CHINESE J. L. 33-38 (1993).
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However, it shall immediately inform the other party of such suspension. It shall
perform the contract if and when the other party provides a sure guarantee for
performance of the contract. If a party suspends performance of the contract
without conclusive evidence of the other party’s inability to perform the contract,
it shall be liable for breach of contract.203

The FECL places a heavy burden on the non-breaching party; it substitutes
the reasonableness standard (“reasonable grounds”) with a “conclusive
evidence” standard. The latter sets a much higher standard to advance a claim of
anticipatory breach. It also severely deters its use since the anticipating party
will be deemed to be in breach if its evidence is determined to be inconclusive.
Furthermore, the FECL does not give the non-breaching party a right to
terminate the contract.
The shortcomings of the FECL’s anticipatory breach rules were at least
implicitly acknowledged when China ratified the CISG in 1986.204 The CISG
incorporates anticipatory breach in Articles 71 and 72. These articles are similar
to the rules found in the American UCC. The drafters of the CCL recognized the
importance of anticipatory breach, but unfortunately decided not to transplant
the better, simpler rules found in the CISG. Instead, they decided to amend the
rules found in the FECL. Unfortunately, these changes did not amount to a
significant improvement.205 First, the changes provide a convoluted set of rules
found in different places in the CCL (Articles 68, 69, 94, and 108). Second,
Articles 68 and 69 retain the extreme language of “conclusive evidence,”
although the CCL, as interpreted, has replaced the notion of providing a “sure
guarantee” found in the FECL in favor of something more reasonable, such as
the need to provide “adequate assurance” of performance.206
The CCL has dual sets of rules or concepts dealing with non-performance
that can easily be conflated. Anticipatory breach is found in Articles 94 and 108,
while “defense of insecurity” is found in Articles 68 and 69. The rest of this
section and the next one will analyze this dual system relating to a party’s fear
of non-performance.
The CCL rules are unclear on the relationship between “defense of
insecurity” and the right to anticipatory breach. “Defense of insecurity” is a term
used in Chinese law, which is different from the concept of insecurity found in
the UCC and Restatement. The Restatement bases the right to declare an
anticipatory breach on the appearance of reasonable grounds for insecurity with
respect to the performance of the other party. As such, parties to a contract are
entitled to “a continuing sense of reliance and security that the promised
203. FECL, supra note 182, art. 17.
204. China signed the CISG on September 30, 1980, which was ratified on December 11, 1986
and became effective on January 1, 1988.
205. Han Guijun & Xiao Guangwen, Comparative Studies of Remedies for Anticipatory
Breach of Contract, in HEBEI L. SCI. (2004); Li Wei & Huang Hui, On Defense of Insecurity
(Einrede der Unsicherheit) and Anticipatory Breach, in MOD. L. REV. (2002); LI YONGJUN, supra
note 162, at 594-96.
206. See PRINCIPLES OF NEW CONTRACT LAW AND COMMENTS ON RELEVANT CASES 316-18
(Cui Jianyuan ed., 1999).
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performance will be forthcoming when it is due.”207 It provides the further
reasoning that a sense of security is an implied part of the contract. Furthermore,
the nature of the ground for insecurity is a factor in determining the nature, or
type, of adequate assurance to be provided to remove the declaration of
anticipatory repudiation.208
Unlike the UCC and Restatement, defense of insecurity in the CCL has
nothing to do with anticipatory repudiation. The Chinese concept of defense of
insecurity originated from the concept of Einrede der Unsicherheit (“Defence of
uncertainty”) in the German Civil Code.209 Under the defense of insecurity
concept in the CCL (implied in CCL Articles 68 and 69), the party who should
perform first may suspend his performance or even terminate the contract if
certain circumstances are met (e.g., insecurity relating to the other party’s
reciprocal performance). There is no reciprocal right of the breaching party to
provide adequate assurance.210 It is important to note Articles 68 and 69 by their
express words only allow for the suspension of the contract; they do not provide
for a right of termination. Rather, it is Articles 94 and 108 that allow for
termination. In sum, both sets of articles are “anticipatory” in nature, but each
pair of articles provides different remedies (suspension versus termination). This
bifurcation serves no reasonable purpose and has caused much confusion and
debate.
4.

CCL Articles 94 and 108

The traditional notion of anticipatory breach is found in CCL Articles 94
and 108. CCL Article 94(2) states that the parties may terminate “before the
period of performance expires, [if] either party clearly indicates by word or by
act that it will not discharge the principal debts.” CCL Article 108 states: “If
either party explicitly expresses or indicates by act its intention not to perform
its obligations under the contract, the other party may, before the expiration of
the period of fulfillment, demand that the party in question bear the liability for
breach of contract.” These phrases recognize express anticipatory breach
(“clearly indicates by word;” “explicitly expresses”) and implied anticipatory
breach (“by act;” “indicates by act”).211
It is important to note there is a difference between non-performance and
delayed performance. Therefore, if the party only indicates it could not perform

207. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 251 cmt. a (1981) (Rationale).
208. Id. cmt. e (Nature and time of assurance).
209. BGB § 321 (Ger.).
210. See Han & Xiao Comparative Studies of Remedies for Anticipatory Breach of Contract,
supra note 205, at 38-43; Li & Huang, On Defense of Insecurity (Einrede der Unsicherheit) and
Anticipatory Breach, supra note 205, at 54-57; LI YONGJUN, supra note 162, at 594-96.
211. The Restatement gives the example of an “act” as one when there are a series of minor
breaches by one of the parties; those acts may be grounds for a declaration of implied anticipatory
breach. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 251 cmt. c (1981) (“[M]inor breaches may give
reasonable grounds for a belief that there will be more serious breaches.”).

http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/bjil/vol34/iss1/5
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.15779/Z38756T

88

BERKELEY JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 34:1

the contract in due time, the party is not liable for anticipatory breach if it can
perform within a reasonable time of the due date. CCL Article 94(3) states the
right to terminate commences when the delayed performance moves beyond a
reasonable time after the non-performing party has been urged to perform. The
language “after being urged” seems to put a duty on the non-breaching party to
make a demand for performance.212 If the breaching party attempts to perform
its delayed performance within a reasonable time, it would seem that under the
principle of good faith213 the party would be required to keep the non-breaching
party aware of the progress of that performance.
5.

Defense of Insecurity in CCL Articles 68 and 69

As discussed above, Article 108 provides a broader rule, while Article 68 is
narrower in scope. This narrowness is due to two elements. First, it allows only
for suspension and not termination of the contract. However, the failure to
provide a right to terminate is alleviated by Article 69, which allows the
suspending party to terminate the contract after suspension of performance if the
other party fails to “reinstate its capacity of performance and does not provide a
sure guarantee” of performance.
Second, Article 68 permits a party that must ordinarily perform first to
suspend its performance if it can provide conclusive evidence that the other
party faces any of the following circumstances: (1) serious deterioration of its
business conditions; (2) diversion of its properties and secret withdrawal of
capital to evade debts; (3) loss of business credibility; or (4) other situations
showing inability or possible inability to meet liabilities. The best that can be
said for the dual systems in the CCL—defense of insecurity in Articles 68 and
69 with anticipatory breach in Article 94 and 108—is that unlike FECL Article
17, the CCL provides a right to terminate the contract in cases of either express
or implied anticipatory breach. Nevertheless, the CCL also has shortcomings.
These shortcomings are discussed in the next section.
6.

Bifurcation of Anticipatory Breach and Defense of Insecurity:
Shortcomings

The two-pronged approach found in CCL Articles 94 and 108 (anticipatory
breach) and Articles 68 and 69 (defense of insecurity) have numerous
shortcomings, causing a great deal of confusion. First, the remedial
consequences of repudiation are unclear. The CCL only provides that the nonbreaching party may terminate the contract and/or hold the repudiating party
liable for breach of contract. However, there is no specific provision that allows
212. CCL, supra note 116, art. 94(3) (“[S]till fails to discharge them within a reasonable period
of time after being urged”).
213. See CCL, supra note 116, art. 5 (“[T]he parties shall abide by the principle of fairness in
defining the rights and obligations of each party.”); see also CCL, supra note 116, art. 6 (“[T]he
parties must act in accordance with the principle of good faith, no matter in exercising rights or in
performing obligations.”).
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the non-breaching party to suspend his performance and require the repudiating
party to provide adequate assurance.
Second, taking a literal interpretation, CCL Article 108 unduly enlarges the
application of anticipatory breach. Namely, it permits a non-breaching party to
terminate the contract regardless of the degree of the breach (material, minor, or
de minimis). As noted above, anticipatory breach under CISG Article 71 must be
serious in nature: “the other party will not perform a substantial part of his
obligations.” However, CCL Article 108 provides that as long as one party
indicates his intention not to perform his “obligations” no matter how trivial the
breach, the other party is entitled to hold the first party liable for anticipatory
breach. An alternative, more reasonable interpretation of the language of CCL
Article 108—“will not perform its obligations under a contract”—is the party
will not perform at all, or at least not in a substantial way. This interpretation
would limit the power to anticipate breach for lesser degrees of nonperformance. This view is supported by the CISG, which requires a
“fundamental breach” in order to avoid or terminate a contract.214
Third, the relationship between defense of insecurity and anticipatory
breach is ambiguous. From the perspective of contextual interpretation and
legislative history, it seems these terms, although related, are conceptually
different. The defense of insecurity is transplanted from civil law, especially
from BGB Article 321,215 while anticipatory breach is transplanted from CISG
Articles 71 and 72, as well as common law.216 However, other than the fact that
defense of insecurity is only applicable to contracts in which the parties are not
expected to perform concurrently, the substance of the two systems are identical
in function.217 Whenever the defense of insecurity is applicable, anticipatory
breach is also applicable. Despite playing similar functions, their inclusion in the
same law is problematic from the perspective of interpretation since they have
different origins and are found in different chapters of the CCL. Namely,
Articles 68 and 69 are found in the chapter on “Fulfillment of the Contract,”
Article 94 is found in the chapter on “Termination of Rights and Obligations
under the Contract,” and Article 108 is found in the chapter on “Liability for
Breach of Contract.”
As a result, some Chinese courts have wrongfully based their decisions on
both Articles 68 and 69 and Articles 94 and 108, while simultaneously equating
anticipatory breach with defense of insecurity.218 Some Chinese courts have
214. See CISG, supra note 4, arts. 25, 49(1), 64(1).
215. BGB § 321 is entitled “Defence of uncertainty.”
216. Foreign Civil Law, supra note 16, at 7-13.
217. Han & Xiao, supra note 205, at 38-43 (explaining that this is the reason some foreign
scholars hold the opinion that CCL Articles 68 and 69 are the “anticipatory breach” provisions.). See
also LARRY A. DIMATTEO & LUCIEN J. DHOOGE, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS LAW: A
TRANSACTIONAL APPROACH 229 (2d ed. 2006).
218. Guangzhou XX Paper Plastic Co. v. Dongguan XX Sports Goods Co., Guangdong
Dongguan
2d
Intermediate
People’s
Court
(2012)
DEFMECZ
No.
392,
http://gdlawyer.chinalawinfo.com/newlaw2002/slc/SLC.asp?Db=fnl&Gid=118621161;
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confused the different systems and held CCL Articles 94 and 108 relate to the
defense of insecurity, instead of anticipatory breach.219 This is despite the fact
that mainstream Chinese scholarship recognizes Articles 94 and 108 as rules
pertaining to anticipatory breach.220
Fourth, while the above conflation of CCL articles may seem irrelevant
because the two concepts serve the same function, the two concepts do in fact
conflict.221 For example, Article 68 allows that a party “may” suspend
performance in defense of insecurity. But the “may” is converted to a “must” if
that party decides to terminate the contract under Article 69. According to CCL
Article 69, only if the other party has failed to regain his capability of meeting its
liabilities and to provide an assurance within a reasonable time, the injured party
can terminate the contract. In addition, under Article 69 the non-breaching party
must have conclusive evidence to believe the other party will not or cannot
perform its obligations and must promptly notify the other party of the
suspension. However, if the other party regains the capability to perform and
provides an adequate assurance or guarantee, the non-breaching party must
continue to perform the contract.222 Thus, under the defense of insecurity
approach, suspension of performance is a precondition for termination.223
However, a different result holds if the non-breaching party brings a suit against
the other party based on the concept of anticipatory breach. Articles 94 and 108
provide that as long as the non-breaching party has evidence to prove that the
other party has indicated by words or acts his intention to not perform his
obligations, the non-breaching party may immediately terminate the contract and
hold the other party liable for the breach.224
Xiamen Juying Refrigeration Entm’t Co. v. Xiamen Colorful Era Entm’t Mgmt. Co. Siming District
People’s
Court,
(2013)
SMCZ
No.
1963,
http://gdlawyer.chinalawinfo.com/newlaw2002/slc/SLC.asp?Db=fnl&Gid=119560631. See also
Guiding Opinions of the Supreme People’s Court on Several Issues Concerning the Trial of Cases of
Disputes over Civil and Commercial Contracts Under the Current Situation (promulgated by Sup.
People’s Ct. July 7, 2009, effective July 7, 2009).
219. See, e.g., Guiding Opinions of the Supreme People’s Court on Several Issues Concerning
the Trial of Cases of Disputes over Civil and Commercial Contracts Under the Current Situation
(promulgated by Sup. People’s Ct. July 7, 2009, effective July 7, 2009).
220. See Han & Xiao, supra note 205, at 38-43; Foreign Civil Law, supra, note 16, at 7-13; Li
& Huang, supra note 205, at 54-57; Ye Jinqiang, Anticipatory Breach in Chinese Contract Law, 4 J.
NANJING U. 52-59 (2002).
221. Li & Huang, supra note 205, at 54-57.
222. See Zhejiang Province Ningbo Hongtu Paper Prods. Indus. & Trade Co. v. Zhejiang
Ningbo Jingying Zhiban Color Printing Co., (Zhejiang Ningbo Intermediate People’s Ct. 2011)
YJSCZD
No.
231;
(2012)
ZYSZZ
No.
30,
http://gdlawyer.chinalawinfo.com/newlaw2002/slc/SLC.asp?Db=fnl&Gid=119235901.
223. See Hunan Debang Med. Co. v. Hunan Liye Gucheng Biotech. Co., (Changsha
Intermediate
People’s
Ct.
2009)
CZMEZZ
No.
0231,
http://gdlawyer.chinalawinfo.com/newlaw2002/slc/SLC.asp?Db=fnl&Gid=118746766.
224. Professor Han Shiyuan holds the view that based on systematic interpretation, the
suspension of performance and sufficient assurance should also be preconditions for the termination
of a contract due to anticipatory breach. See Han Shiyuan, The CISG and Modernisation of Chinese
Contract Law, 18 COMP. L.J. THE PAC. 75 (2014) (contributions to the Study of International Trade
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Reforming the CCL Anticipatory Breach-Defense of Security Regime

In anticipation of the passage of the Chinese Civil Code, Articles 68, 69,
94, and 108 should be amended. The Draft CCC,225 in Article 915, retains the
substance of the defense of insecurity currently found in CCL Articles 68 and
69. But, in Article 921, the Draft CCC amends the requirements for anticipatory
breach in the following manner:
Before the expiration of the contract, if one party has indicated by words that he
will not perform his principal obligations, the other party may terminate the
contract.

Although Article 915 uses the phrase “principal obligations,” Draft CCC
Article 921 fails to define the nature of the breach in determining the
appropriateness of anticipating a breach. In particular, Draft CCC Article 921
states: “[i]n case either party indicates expressly by words or by acts that he will
not perform the contract, the other party may, before the expiration of the
contract, hold the first party liable for breach of contract.”226 Therefore, there is
still doubt, just as in CCL Article 108, about whether the Draft CCC will
continue to unduly enlarge the application of anticipatory breach.227 It should
also be noted the Draft CCC does not address the right to suspend performance
and the requirement to provide notice of suspension.
Before the new Civil Code is adopted, Chinese courts may play an
important role in resolving the deficiencies in the CCL. Recently, the court in
Xiamen XX Paper Packaging Industry Co. v. Longhai XX Metal Co., Ltd.228
held:
The Defendant Longhai XX Metal Co., Ltd. had not performed its obligation of
payment in accordance with the sales contract entered into by and between the
plaintiff and defendant. The defendant had delayed two installments of payment.
When the plaintiff required the defendant to pay the whole contract price, the
defendant refused on the ground[s] of lack of money. Since the defendant failed
to provide any evidence that he would pay the price when it would be due, the
defendant indicates that he would not perform his obligations in accordance with
the contract. The defendant’s act has obviously constituted an anticipatory breach
under the CCL Article 108.229

The logic behind this civil judgment is that if the defendant could provide
sufficient assurance of payment when it is to become due, it is not an

Law and Alternative Dispute Resolution in the South Pacific).
225. Liang, PROPOSITIONAL CCC, supra note 133.
226. Id. at 175, 204 (explaining the Draft Civil Code tries to harmonize the two systems of
Defense of Insecurity and Anticipatory Breach, instead of simply deleting one and adopting the
other).
227. Id. (indicating that just like CCL Article 108, Draft CC Article 921 continues to provide
that, as long as one party indicates his intention not to perform his “obligations,” no matter how
trivial the breach, the other party is entitled to hold the first party liable for the anticipatory breach).
228. Xiamen XX Paper Packaging Indus. Co. v. Longhai XX Metal Co., (Fujian Longhai
People’s
Ct.
2011)
LMCZ
No.
1682
(China),
http://gdlawyer.chinalawinfo.com/newlaw2002/slc/slc.asp?db=fnl&gid=118864232
229. Id.
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anticipatory breach. Therefore, if the defendant had provided sufficient evidence
that he could pay the price, this would not be an anticipatory breach. This closes
a loophole in Article 108 by confirming not all possible future breaches
constitute an anticipatory breach. However, when the first party demands
adequate assurance of performance, the CCL continues to place a very high
burden on the “breaching” party’s ability to obtain a retraction of the
anticipatory breach since it must demonstrate a restored capacity to perform and
provide an “adequate” guarantee of performance.230 If the other party fails to
provide such assurance within a reasonable time, the first party may hold it
liable for anticipatory breach.
Fortunately, courts have stepped in to try to prevent the abuse of the right
to declare an anticipatory breach. First, in Shanxi Xinlei Commercial Concrete
Co. v. Guangxia Construction Group Co. (2013),231 the appellate court held,
consistently with this Article’s argument, that slight delays of the first two
payments did not constitute an anticipatory breach of future payment
obligations. Second, in XX Group Co. v. Shanghai XX Concrete Products Co.,232
the court recognized the non-breaching party (Shanghai XX) may choose to hold
the other party (XX Group) in anticipatory breach immediately, or it may ignore
the breach and wait until the time for performance passes (actual breach), which
the CCL does not expressly acknowledge. This right to choose makes some
sense when the object of the contract is what the non-breaching party needs. It
becomes even more sensible when the object is unique (not replaceable).
Therefore, the non-breaching party may try to save the contract by attempting to
persuade the breaching party to retract his refusal to perform.233
In A Co. v. B Co.,234 the Shanghai First Intermediate People’s Court
affirmed the party’s choice to declare or not declare an anticipatory breach.
However, it noted the non-breaching party must not misuse its right by ignoring
the breach and waiting for the time for performance.235 This need for the nonbreaching party to “accept” the anticipatory breach is grounded in its duty to
mitigate damages.236 The willful neglect of an anticipatory breach by the non-

230. See LIMING, STUDY ON CONTRACT LAW, supra note 152, at 510-13.
231. Shanxi Xinlei Commercial Concrete Co. v. Guangxia Constr. Grp. Co. (Shanxi Higher
People’s
Ct.
2013)
SMEZZ
No.
00012
(China),
http://gdlawyer.chinalawinfo.com/newlaw2002/slc/slc.asp?db=fnl&gid=119875238.
232. XX Grp. Co. v. Shanghai XX Concrete Prods. Co. (Shanghai 1st Intermediate People’s
Ct.
2012)
HYZMS(S)ZZ
No.
147
(China),
http://gdlawyer.chinalawinfo.com/newlaw2002/slc/slc.asp?db=fnl&gid=118433657.
233. See also Shandong Precise Elec. Tech. Co. v. Guangzhou Great Power Energy & Tech.
Co. (Guangdong Guanzhou Intermediate People’s Court 2013) HZFMEZZ No. 1477 (China),
http://gdlawyer.chinalawinfo.com/newlaw2002/slc/SLC.asp?Db=fnl&Gid=119630924
(same
conclusion).
234. A Co. v. B Co. (Shanghai 1st Intermediate People’s Ct. 2012) HYZMS(S)ZZ No. 1962
(China), http://gdlawyer.chinalawinfo.com/newlaw2002/slc/SLC.asp?Db=fnl&Gid=118848655,.
235. Id.
236. CCL, supra note 116, art. 119 (non-breaching “party shall take proper measures to
prevent from the enlargement of losses; if the other party fails to take proper measures so that the
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breaching party may also violate the principle of good faith.237 Therefore, the
non-breaching party must accept the anticipatory breach and terminate the
contract immediately so as to avoid incurring any further damages, if that is the
only reasonable course of action.
The above case law shows promise that Chinese courts will, often
creatively, interpret and implement provisions of the CCL in a way that
produces fair and efficient outcomes. However, nothing short of statutory
amendment will be able to resolve the inconsistencies, gaps, and ambiguities
presented by Articles 68, 69, 94, and 108. The reform would need to: (1) define
“adequate guarantee;” (2) abolish the dual system of defense of insecurity and
anticipatory breach and replace it with a single, uniform set of rules; (3) apply a
single set of uniform anticipatory breach rules to make clear when suspension
rather than termination is appropriate; (4) prohibit the non-breaching party from
ignoring an express repudiation of performance or indications of an implied
repudiation, as noted in XX Group Co.238 and A Co. v. B Co.;239 and (5) make
clear minor breaches in most circumstances should not be grounds for
anticipatory breach, especially when this tactic is used opportunistically by the
non-breaching party, as noted in Shanxi Xinlei Commercial Concrete.240
C. Lack of a Right to Cure
The seller’s right to cure refers to the breaching party’s right to cure defects
in its performance. Usually, in the case of the seller, this right manifests itself
either through the repair or replacement of defective goods.241 The relevant laws
only offered the non-breaching buyer the choice of either returning the defective
goods to the seller in order to recover the full contract price, or keeping the
defective goods and recovering the diminution in value of the defective goods,
as compared to conforming goods.242 Thus, the seller had no right to cure the
defects unless the buyer agreed to receive substituted goods from the seller.
1.

Modern Right to Cure

The dawn of industrial production during the middle of the nineteenth
century was accompanied by the mass production and supply of goods. As a
consequence, repair or replacement of defective goods by the seller, as an
alternative remedy to termination and price reduction, surfaced as an issue that
losses are enlarged, it may not claim any compensation as to the enlarged losses”).
237. CCL, supra note 116, art. 6 (“The parties must act in accordance with the principle of
good faith, no matter in exercising rights or in performing obligations.”).
238. Supra note 192.
239. Supra note 194.
240. Supra note 191.
241. See Gerhard Wagner, Termination and Cure under the Common European Sales Law:
Avoiding Pitfalls in Contract Remedies (June 12, 2012), http:ssrn.com/abstract=2083049 (last
accessed Sep. 6, 2016).
242. Id.
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continued to challenge the civil law and the law of sales throughout subsequent
decades and well into the twentieth century. In Germany, the framers of the
Civil Code of 1900 failed to depart from tradition and did not insert a right of
repair and replacement into statutory remedies.243 As a consequence,
commercial practice developed to recognize cure by sellers as a standard remedy
for delivery of non-conforming goods.244
In the United States, Karl Llewellyn245 inserted into the 1952 Draft of the
UCC the breaching party’s right to cure.246 Since then, the right to cure has been
widely accepted in both civil and common law.247 The CISG also provides for a
seller’s right to cure. For example, CISG Articles 34 and 37 allow the seller to
cure non-conforming documents or non-conforming goods before the sales
contract expires, while Article 48 offers the seller the right to cure nonconforming goods or documents for a period of time after the expiration of the
delivery date set forth in the sales contract.248 PICC Article 7.1.4 expands the
right to cure beyond the sale of goods to other types of contracts.249 It is
generally acknowledged that the allowance of a reasonable opportunity to cure
is consistent with the notion of good faith and fair dealing250 and with the desire
to maintain contractual relations251 where possible and appropriate.252 A
reasonable opportunity to cure is also consistent with the spirit of mitigating loss
and minimizing economic waste.253

243.
244.

See id.
See id.; see also SCHLECHTRIEM & SCHWENZER, supra note 103, at 563 n.2; JAMES J.
WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 320 (4th ed. 1995).
245. “Llewellyn held the view that, at least in transactions between merchants, the seller
deserved the privilege to cure delivery of non-conforming goods by means of a second tender.”
Wagner, supra note 241, at 2; see also K.N. Llewellyn, On Warranty of Quality, and Society: II, 37
COLUM. L. REV. 341, 388-89 (1937).
246. See U.C.C. § 2-508 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2014).
247. See, e.g., Danish Sale of Goods Act §49, Købeloven, Act no. 102 (April 4, 1906); Sales of
Goods Act (SFS 1990:931) (Köplagen) (Swed.). Even English law recognizes the seller’s right to
cure before or after the time for performance if time is not of the essence of the contract. See DCFR,
supra note 139, 835-38. For an explanation of the right to cure in Germany, see Andreas Heldrich &
Gebhard M. Rehm, Modernisation of the German Law of Obligations: Harmonization of Civil Law
and Common Law in the Recent Reform of the German Civil Code, in COMPARATIVE REMEDIES FOR
BREACH OF CONTRACT 129 (Nili Cohen & Ewan McKendrick eds., 2005).
248. See SCHLECHTRIEM & SCHWENZER, supra note 103, at 406-08, 440-45, 562-73.
249. See COMMENTARY ON THE PICC, supra note 70, at 747-52.
250. See BIANCA & BONELL, supra note 135, at 291; see also CCL, supra note 116, arts. 5, 6.
251. Contract maintenance is an underlying principle of the CCL, which can be found in the
following articles: 8, 10, 19, 22, 28-31, 36, 40, 45, 47, 49-51, 54, 55, 61, 62, 68, 69, 73, 74, 76, 78.
252. See, e.g., Bertram Keller, Early Delivery and Seller’s Right to Cure Lack of Conformity:
Article 37 CISG and UNIDROIT Principles Comparative, PACE L. SCH. INST. OF INT’L AND COM. L.
(June
11,
2004),
http://www.jus.uio.no/pace/early_delivery_and_sellers_right_to_cure_cisg_article_37_and_upicc_co
mparative.bertram_keller/sisu_manifest.html.
253. Id.; see also CCL, supra note 116, art. 119 (mitigation of damages).
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CCL’s Lack of a Right to Cure

It is the authors’ experience that in Chinese domestic trade practice, it is
widely accepted that the breaching party may cure the non-performance before
the expiration of the date for performance. In some industries, it is customary
practice to provide the breaching party with the ability to repair or replace any
non-performance within a fixed period of time, or within a reasonable time after
the expiration of the time of performance.254 Despite the commercial practice of
acknowledging the right to cure, along with the civil and common laws’
adoption of such a right, the CCL has neglected to do so.
The best remedy would be to amend the CCL to include such a right or to
insert such a right in the proposed Chinese Civil Code. The second best remedy
would be for the court to imply such a right into the CCL. The Chinese Supreme
Court has issued a judicial interpretation recognizing the right to cure in the area
of construction contracts.255 For example, the Court implicitly recognized a
contractor’s right to cure, upholding the contract-offering party’s claim for a
reduction in construction price in Article 11 “if construction fails to comply with
the quality requirements as agreed due to the contractor’s fault, and the
contractor refuses to repair, rework or modify.”256 Therefore, based on Article
11, if the contractor agrees or offers to repair, rework or rebuild (namely, to cure
the non-conformity), the non-breaching party’s claim for price reduction is not
supported. Professor Han has suggested a rationale for doing so by linking the
right to cure to a price reduction remedy.257 According to CISG Article 50, it is
clear that the seller’s right to cure prevails over the buyer’s right to reduce the
price.258 Therefore, Han suggests Chinese courts could recognize the right to
cure to limit the need for a price reduction in certain situations, with the
outcome being the buyer receives conforming goods, and the seller receives the
full contract price.259
254. See Wuhan Billion City Unifs. Co. v. Henan Lishen Machs. Co. (Fugou People’s Ct.
2009)
FMZZ
No.
5,
http://gdlawyer.chinalawinfo.com/newlaw2002/slc/slc.asp?db=fnl&gid=117664199;
Guangzhou
Dingxin Elec. Tech. Co. v. Li Chengbei (Guangzhou Intermediate People’s Ct. 2012) HZFMEZZ
No. 2555, http://gdlawyer.chinalawinfo.com/newlaw2002/slc/SLC.asp?Db=fnl&Gid=119660010;
Wang Guangke v. Shandong Joyo Constr. Mach. Co. (Henan Kaifeng People’s Ct. 2006) KMCZ No.
1721; Yancheng Gaoyang Sci. & Tech. Co. v. Zhangjiagang Thensin Rubber & Plastic Electromech.
Co.
(Nanjing
Qixia
People’s
Ct.
2010)
QSCZ
No.
43,
http://gdlawyer.chinalawinfo.com/newlaw2002/slc/SLC.asp?Db=fnl&Gid=118862642;
Zhejiang
Huzhou Suning Appliance Co. v. Yang Yongqiang (Zhejiang Huzhou People’s Ct. 2009) HWSZZ
No. 386, http://gdlawyer.chinalawinfo.com/newlaw2002/slc/SLC.asp?Db=fnl&Gid=119205793.
255. Interpretation of the Supreme People’s Court on Issues Concerning the Application of
Law for the Trial of Cases of Dispute Over Contracts on Undertaking Construction Projects
(promulgated by the Judicial Comm. Sup. People’s Ct., Sept. 29, 2004, effective Jan. 1, 2005), arts.
3, 11.
256. Id. art. 11.
257. See Han Shiyuan, Logic Structure of Price Reduction, 2 TSINGHUA L. REV. 24 (2008)
[hereinafter Logic Structure].
258. See SCHLECHTRIEM & SCHWENZER, supra note 103, at 599.
259. See Logic Structure, supra note 257, at 25.

http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/bjil/vol34/iss1/5
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.15779/Z38756T

96

BERKELEY JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 34:1

Another way to incorporate the right to cure into the CCL is by invoking
the principle of good faith. If the breaching party can cure the non-performance
without undue delay and without causing the non-breaching party unreasonable
inconvenience or uncertainty, it would undermine the principle of good faith to
not offer the breaching party the right to cure.260 For example, this would be the
case when the breaching party’s non-performance is not fundamental, and the
non-breaching party claims damages instead of specific performance (repair or
replacement).261 The lack of a seller’s right to cure produces an inefficient
outcome in the form of wasted expenditures and termination of the contractual
relationship.
Including the right to cure into the CCL would also address the current
imbalance between buyer and seller rights. Currently, a buyer within the CCL
remedial scheme can allow the seller to cure by providing a time extension for
performance (nachfrist notice),262 or it can “force” the seller to cure through a
demand for specific performance.263 But, these rights are exercised purely at the
discretion of the non-breaching party. As noted above, the non-breaching party
may ignore these alternatives by simply declaring an avoidance (termination) of
the contract and demanding damages. The CCL should provide a party the right
to cure when such a cure can be effectuated promptly and without undue
inconvenience to the other party. The strongest case for such a right is when the
non-breaching party does not suffer any damages by allowing the breaching
party to cure, whether within the contractual time for performance or by an
extension of the time for performance. This outcome would align with core
principles of contract law, including those of good faith, mitigation of damages,
and preservation of the contractual relationship. It would also deter opportunistic
behavior, such as when the buyer uses the existence of minor defects that can be
easily cured to terminate the contract with the purpose of taking advantage of
market changes. Fortunately, the lack of an express right to cure has not caused
many cases of injustice or waste because Chinese contracts customarily stipulate
such a right.264 However, the law does not require such a stipulation, leaving
open possibilities whereby the parties may inadvertently forget to include such a
provision, or a party with superior bargaining power may decline to give the
other party such a right.

260. CCL Article 6 is a foundational principle of the CCL and states that: “The parties shall
observe the principle of good faith in exercising their rights and fulfilling their obligations.”
261. CCL, supra note 116, art. 111.
262. CCL, supra note 116, art. 94(3).
263. See CCL, supra note 116, arts. 110-11.
264. See, e.g., Construction Contract (Model Form) (GF-2013-0201) art. 13.2.4,
http://www.mohurd.gov.cn/wbdt/xzzx/sfwb/w02015090220803046317608631.doc (last accessed
Mar. 17, 2015).
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Reforming the CCL’s Lack of a Right to Cure

The CCL’s failure to provide a right to cure is an unfortunate gap that does
not bode well for the future. The Draft CCC provides a “Right to Cure” in
Articles 937 and 938:
Article 937:
(1) In case any party to the contract has failed to perform the contract and if
the performance period has not become due or his delayed performance
has not constituted a fundamental breach, the breaching party may retender a compliant performance at his own expenses.
(2) In case the breaching party intends to cure the contract in accordance
with Para. (1) herein, the following conditions shall also be met: (a)
without undue delay, it gives notice indicating the proposed manner and
timing of the cure; (b) cure is appropriate in the circumstances; (c) the
aggrieved party has no legitimate interest in refusing cure; and (d) cure
is effected promptly.

Article 938:
(1) Upon effective notice of cure, rights of the aggrieved party that are
inconsistent with the breaching party’s performance are suspended until
the time for cure has expired.
(2) The aggrieved party may withhold performance pending cure.
(3) Notwithstanding cure, the aggrieved party retains the right to claim
damages for delay as well as for any harm caused or not prevented by
the cure.265

This provision is drawn from PICC Article 7.1.4. Unfortunately, the Draft
CCC Articles 937 and 938 leave a number of questions unanswered. First, they
fail to expressly maintain the superiority of the non-breaching party’s right to
terminate the contract in cases of fundamental or substantial breach.266 Second,
one glaring example of the need to retain this priority is in installment contracts.
Because of the obligations to perform numerous installments pursuant to such a
contract, one breach can lead to a pattern of breaches, thus making it easier to
abuse the right to cure over time. Third, some have argued that, in order to offer
consumers better protection, the right to cure should not be available if the nonbreaching party is a consumer.267 If this were the case, the consumer, instead of
the merchant, would retain more freedom to choose the remedies, including
repair, replacement, damages, or termination. Thus, the law should make
explicit that the right to cure does not extend to consumer contracts.

265. Liang, PROPOSITIONAL CCC, supra note 133, at 211-12, 215.
266. See generally Michael Bridge, Avoidance for Fundamental Breach of Contract Under the
UN Convention on the International Sale of Goods, 59 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 911 (2010). But for a
different opinion, see PICC Article 7.1.4, which provides clearly that the right to cure shall prevail
over the right to terminate. In CISG jurisprudence, this issue remains unsettled, but the prevailing
view seems to be that the right to terminate (avoid) the contract prevails over the right to cure. But
when judging whether the breach is fundamental, the possibility of cure shall be considered. See
CISG-AC Opinion no 5, The buyer’s right to avoid the contract in case of non-conforming goods or
documents, 7 May 2005, Badenweiler (Ger.).
267. CESL, supra note 134, at 490-92.
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CONCLUSION
This Article uses the CCL to explore the pitfalls of the reception and
transplantation of foreign laws and influences into a different legal culture.
China is an especially interesting case because its CCL reflects a myriad of
influences from the civil law (especially the German BGB), common law, and
the American UCC, as well as international legal instruments, such as the CISG
and the PICC. In this case, the CCL drafters’ study and application of this
multitude of foreign and international laws, although admirable, has resulted in a
less than clear and comprehensive contract law. This has caused substantial
confusion, hindering the Chinese courts’ abilities to properly apply the rules in a
uniform manner.
This Article analyzes some of the gaps and inconsistencies in the CCL to
illustrate how such borrowing can lead to a less than consistent and
comprehensive contract law. The areas of study here include the CCL’s late
acceptance rules, its dual system of anticipatory breach and defense of
insecurity, and its lack of a right to cure.
The analysis also considers the problem of “double transplantation.” In the
case of China, it adopted the CISG as its (domestic) international sales law,
which was the first transplant. China then used the CISG as a source in drafting
the CCL, the second transplant. Unfortunately, this second transplantation was
only partial, since it only transferred some of the CISG rules to the CCL and
used other sources for the rest of the CCL, creating a number of problems. First,
partial transplantation results in unnecessary inconsistencies between the CCL
and the CISG. Second, taking rules out of the context of the body of rules in
which they are initially located increases the uncertainty of their meanings when
transplanted into a different body of rules. This has certainly been the case in the
interpretation and application of the CCL.
Since the CCL is a product of numerous foreign laws, this Article uses a
comparative law methodology to try to understand the meaning of the rules in
the CCL. It also uses comparative law sources to offer solutions and avenues of
legal reform in order to make the CCL a more rational, consistent, and
comprehensive contract law. The primary sources analyzed include the German
BGB, American UCC, and the common law as represented by the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts, as well as the CISG and PICC. This Article also draws
from other sources, such as the Dutch Civil Code (BW), Louisiana Civil Code,
and the Civil Code of Québec, as well as the PECL and the proposed (but,
ultimately rejected) CESL. Finally, this Article uses the interpretive guidelines
issued by the Chinese Supreme Court and the Draft Chinese Civil Code in its
analysis.
In making recommendations to reform the CCL, this Article draws on both
comparative law approaches—the “common core” and the “better rules.”268 The
wide array of this comparative analysis ferrets out a great deal of commonalities
268.

Supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text.
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between contract rules across different legal systems. This commonality is a
powerful rationale for realigning and reforming the CCL. When comparative
analysis uncovers differences in rules across legal systems, this Article
recommends the use of “better rules” interpretations in the context of the
existing CCL. The rules suggested here capture the reasonable expectations of
both parties, encourage the efficient conclusion of contracts, and deter
opportunistic behavior.
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